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Abstract
Most models of aircraft trajectories are non-linear and stochastic in nature;
and their internal parameters are often poorly deﬁned. The ability to model,
simulate and analyze realistic air traﬃc management conﬂict detection sce-
narios in a scalable, composable, multi-aircraft fashion is an extremely dif-
ﬁcult endeavor. Accurate techniques for aircraft mode detection are critical
in order to enable the precise projection of aircraft conﬂicts, and for the
enactment of altitude separation resolution strategies.
Conﬂict detection is an inherently probabilistic endeavor; our ability to
detect conﬂicts in a timely and accurate manner over a ﬁxed time horizon
is traded oﬀ against the increased human workload created by false alarms
—that is, situations that would not develop into an actual conﬂict, or would
resolve naturally in the appropriate time horizon-thereby introducing a mea-
sure of probabilistic uncertainty in any decision aid fashioned to assist air
traﬃc controllers. The interaction of the continuous dynamics of the air-
craft, used for prediction purposes, with the discrete conﬂict detection logic
gives rise to the hybrid nature of the overall system. The introduction of the
probabilistic element, common to decision alerting and aiding devices, places
the conﬂict detection and resolution problem in the domain of probabilistic
hybrid phenomena.
A hidden Markov model (HMM) has two stochastic components: a ﬁnite-
state Markov chain and a ﬁnite set of output probability distributions. In
other words an unobservable stochastic process (hidden) that can only be ob-
served through another set of stochastic processes that generate the sequence
of observations. The problem of self separation in distributed air traﬃc man-
agement reduces to the ability of aircraft to communicate state information
to neighboring aircraft, as well as model the evolution of aircraft trajectories
between communications, in the presence of probabilistic uncertain dynamics
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as well as partially observable and uncertain data. We introduce the Hybrid
Hidden Markov Modeling (HHMM) formalism to enable the prediction of
the stochastic aircraft states (and thus, potential conﬂicts), by combining
elements of the probabilistic timed input output automaton and the par-
tially observable Markov decision process frameworks, along with the novel
addition of a Markovian scheduler to remove the non-deterministic elements
arising from the enabling of several actions simultaneously. Comparisons of
aircraft in level, climbing/descending and turning ﬂight are performed, and
unknown ﬂight track data is evaluated probabilistically against the tuned
model in order to assess the eﬀectiveness of the model in detecting the switch
between multiple ﬂight modes for a given aircraft. This also allows for the
generation of probabilistic distribution over the execution traces of the hy-
brid hidden Markov model, which then enables the prediction of the states
of aircraft based on partially observable and uncertain data.
Based on the composition properties of the HHMM, we study a decen-
tralized air traﬃc system where aircraft are moving along streams and can
perform cruise, accelerate, climb and turn maneuvers.We develop a common
decentralized policy for conﬂict avoidance with spatially distributed agents
(aircraft in the sky) and assure its safety properties via correctness proofs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Air Traﬃc Control
The goal of air traﬃc control ATC) system is to accomplish the safe, eﬃcient
ﬂow of traﬃc from origin to destination. The task of air traﬃc control in-
cludes ground operations from the gate to the taxiway to the runway, takeoﬀ
and climb operations to reach a cruising altitude, cross-country ﬂight to the
destination, approach and landing operations at the destination, and taxi
back to the gate. There are three general classes of controllers. Ground and
local controllers (referred to as tower controllers) handle aircraft on the taxi-
ways and runways and also through takeoﬀs and landings. Radar controllers
handle aircraft from their takeoﬀ to their cruising altitude (departure control)
and then return them through their approach at the destination (approach
control). The busy region surrounding airport facilities is called the terminal
radar control area, TRACON. En-route controllers working at the air route
traﬃc control center (ARTCC) manage the ﬂow of traﬃc along the airways
between the TRACON areas. Flow of aircraft across the entire United States
is managed by the Air Traﬃc Control System Command Center in Herndon,
Virginia. [1]
In the current ATC system, the pilot determines the ﬂight’s objectives
and decides how those objectives can best be met. The objectives include the
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destination airport, route of ﬂight, proposed altitude, cruising airspeed, time
of departure, climb and descent proﬁles, and speed schedules [2]. However,
the controller gets only a limited number of these objectives through the
ﬂight plan. Using this limited information, the controller is responsible for
separating aircraft.
Detection of conﬂicts —deﬁned here as the potential loss of prescribed
separation [3] —between two aircraft is the primary purpose of air traﬃc con-
trol. This task, multiplied by a large number of aircraft pairs under a single
controller’s responsibility at any time exacts a high toll on human controllers
in terms of mental workload; furthermore, the potential consequences of a
miss —a midair collision —are simply unacceptable within the modern air
transportation systems. Therefore, ATC procedures have been designed to
maximize safety (i.e., to minimize the potential of conﬂicts) with a necessary
tradeoﬀ in reduced system capacity.
Safety is ensured, in large part, by guaranteeing minimum vertical and
lateral separation. To ensure total safety, the aircraft would never ﬂy. And to
ensure a greater safety level than what we have today, separation thresholds
would be greater than what we currently practice. However, this compromise
the second goal of ATC, eﬃciency, which is demanded by consumers and
pilots. Every airport has a capacity, i.e., the number of aircraft it can receive
per unit of time. And the goal is to meet this capacity. Optimization is
limited by changes in the weather, wake vortices following the passage of
heavy aircraft and the limited ability to predict the future.
For the current ATC system, for en-route airspace the minimum hori-
zontal separation if 5 nmi, while the minimum vertical separation is 1000 ft.
When the controller is separating aircraft, it is required to ensure that the
airspace reserved for one aircraft does not overlap the airspace reserved for
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another. Controllers use four methods to separate aircraft: vertical, lateral,
longitudinal, and visual separation [2]. The basic vertical separation method
is for the controller to request that the pilot report passing through or lev-
eling oﬀ at a particular altitude. Once this altitude has been reported, the
controller can assign another altitude to a diﬀerent aircraft, as long as the
two altitudes diﬀer by at least 1000 feet. One exception to this rule is that
if both aircraft are climbing, once the higher aircraft has reported leaving an
assigned altitude and is climbing to an altitude at least 1000 feet higher, the
lower aircraft may be assigned the altitude the ﬁrst aircraft has vacated.
Exclusive use of vertical separation can result in ineﬃcient use of airspace.
Thus, controllers consider alternating methods of separating aircraft, one of
which is lateral separation. With lateral separation, each aircraft must be
established on an airway whose protected airspaces do not overlap. If this
cannot be accomplished, one of the other methods of separation should be
used.
Holding patterns are used whenever an aircraft does not have suﬃcient
airspace to continue toward its destination. An aircraft is restricted to a
small area when it is within a holding pattern. By clearing aircraft to ﬂy
either above or below other holding aircraft, vertical separation is applied.
To ensure lateral separation (when the reserved airspace for the holding air-
craft does not overlap with the reserved airspace belonging to other aircraft)
the controller should take into account the speed of the aircraft. Since the
inbound leg of a standard holding pattern is one minute, faster aircraft will
cover a greater distance in that time.
Longitudinal separation between two aircraft that are ﬂying along the
same route can be applied when the aircraft are ﬂying at or near the same
airspeed or the leading aircraft is signiﬁcantly faster.
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Visual separation is one of the most ﬂexible methods. In this method, it
is required that either of the pilots sees the other aircraft and provide the
required separation, or that the controller is able to see both aircraft and
provide safe separation.
Air traﬃc is expected to grow by 5% annually over the next decade. In
view of the current ATC limitations, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and the aviation community are working together on two initiatives:
Free Flight, and ATC modernization. Free ﬂight allows pilots to choose their
own routes, altitudes, and speeds and modify them in real time as they see ﬁt.
User preference would be restricted only in congested airspace or to prevent
unauthorized entry of special use airspace. Free ﬂight is potentially feasi-
ble because of enabling technologies, like Global Positioning system (GPS),
datalink communications like Automatic Dependence Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B), Traﬃc Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS), and pow-
erful on-board computation.
To increase system throughput and the number of aircraft individual con-
trollers can safely monitor under the demand of increased traﬃc levels, several
automated aids that detect conﬂicts based on complex algorithms have been
developed. However, such automated tools are inherently imperfect [4, 5].
NASA’s Center-TRACON Automation System (CTAS) [6] and MITRE’s
URET [7] are decision support tools for ground controllers.
CTAS is a system developed by NASA that provides users with airspace
capacity improvement, delay reductions and fuel savings by using computer
automation to assist controllers in eﬃciently descending, sequencing, and
spacing arriving aircraft. It provides four functions: traﬃc management
advisor, descent advisor, ﬁnal approach spacing toll, and expedite departure
path.
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The User Request Evaluation Tool (URET) was developed at MITRE
Corporation’s Center for Advanced Aviation System Development (CAASD)
to assist controllers with detection and resolution of predicted problems.
URET combines real-time ﬂight plan and track data (from the ARTCC Host
computer) with site adaptation, aircraft performance characteristics, and
winds and temperatures (from the National Weather Service) in order to
construct four-dimensional ﬂight proﬁles. It also adapts each trajectory to
the observed behavior of aircraft (speed, climb and descent rate) [7]. URET
uses its predicted trajectories to continuously check for conﬂicts up to 20
minutes into the future and displays an alert to the appropriate sector. It
also provides a trial plan which allows a controller to check a desired ﬂight
plan amendment for potential conﬂicts before issuing a clearance. [3]
Combined with the innately probabilistic nature of conﬂict detection and
the asymmetrical valuing of the two erroneous outcomes, misses and false
alarms —that is, situations that would not develop into an actual conﬂict,
or would resolve naturally in the appropriate time horizon —automated con-
ﬂict alerting systems frequently produce large numbers of false alarms that
again contribute to increased workload of the human controllers overseeing
the system. Such probabilistic uncertainty associated with automated deci-
sion aids greatly reduces their usability and acceptability in the workplace;
conversely, improvements in the reliability (i.e., reduced false alarm rates)
of automated conﬂict detection systems will help to bring about their full
potential in increasing the system capacity without undue drawbacks in con-
troller workload and trust. The interaction of the continuous dynamics of
the aircraft, used for prediction purposes, with the discrete conﬂict detection
logic gives rise to the hybrid nature of the overall system. The introduc-
tion of the probabilistic element, common to decision alerting and aiding
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devices, places the conﬂict detection and resolution problem in the domain
of probabilistic hybrid phenomena.
1.2 Hybrid System
Hybrid systems involve both continuous dynamics as well as discrete phe-
nomena. The continuous dynamics of hybrid systems, generally given by
diﬀerential equations, may be continuous-time, discrete-time, or mixed. The
discrete variable dynamics of hybrid systems are generally governed by a
digital automaton, or an input-output transition system with a countable
number of states. We can assume a hybrid system to a run with a sequence
of steps. The system evolves continuously, within each step, until a transition
occurs. Transitions are instantaneous state changes that separate continuous
state evolutions.
Due to the inherent uncertainty existing in real world problems, stochas-
tic hybrid and switched modeling formalisms [8] are prevalent in the repre-
sentation of physical systems. Stochastic hybrid systems arise in numerous
applications of systems with multiple nodes, such as ﬂexible manufacturing
system, air traﬃc management, etc. This idea is not new and many mod-
els of stochastic hybrid systems have been proposed. The major point of
distinction lies in the manner in which the randomness or stochasticity is
incorporated into the model.
Generally, the data received for conﬂict detection purposes is noisy, and
limited in its scope (i.e. position, speed and heading). Fortunately, air-
craft behavior can be characterized by several standard ﬂight modes, such as
steady level ﬂight, climbing ﬂight, turning ﬂight, etc. However, due to the
noise associated with the ﬂight track data, and the lack of intent information,
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it is often diﬃcult to determine whether a given aircraft is adhering to its
declared ﬂight plan. In order to estimate the mode of ﬂight, the observed
position, speed and heading data must be analyzed, and a probabilistic dis-
tribution over the possible modes must be determined. This task lends itself
to the framework of Hidden Markov Modeling (HMM), which is used here to
detect ﬂight mode changes.
1.3 Hidden Markov Models
The Hidden Markov Model [9] is comprised of a ﬁnite set of states, each of
which is associated with a (generally multidimensional) probability distri-
bution. Transitions among the states are governed by a set of probabilities
called transition probabilities. In a particular state an outcome or observa-
tion can be generated, according to the associated probability distribution.
It is only the outcome, not the state, that is visible to an external observer:
therefore the states of the system are hidden from the observer, hence the
name Hidden Markov Model.
Hybrid Input/Output Automata, HIOAs, are used in description and
analysis of hybrid systems. We use the HIOA framework developed in Ref.
10.
1.4 Hybrid Input/Output Automata
(HIOA)
HIOA is an automaton framework for describing discrete and continuous
behavior. The simplest HIOA consists of sets of internal variables, internal
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actions, transitions and trajectories. Valuations of the internal variables
deﬁne the the states of the automaton, which can change continuously over a
period of time (trajectories) and discretely through transitions. The behavior
of an HIOA is modeled as an alternating sequence of actions and trajectories,
referred to as an execution. An HIOA is a nondeterministic automaton which
can communicate both discretely (through shared actions) and continuously
(through shared variables) with other HIOAs. The external interface of the
HIOA is deﬁned by adding sets of input and output variables and input
and output actions. The externally visible behavior corresponding to an
execution, called a trace, is obtained by removing all the internal variables
and actions from the execution.
In HIOAs, uncertainties are captured as nondeterministic choices. Nonde-
terminism can describe uncertainty as a set of possible choices. Incorporating
probabilities in hybrid systems framework yields a richer language for model
construction called Probabilistic Timed I/O Automata (PTIOA), which pro-
vides a mathematical framework for modeling and verifying computing sys-
tems that interact with uncertain systems. PTIOA supports continuous evo-
lution, nondeterminism, probabilistic transitions, and discrete communica-
tions between components.
In order to generate the probability distribution over a set of executions of
a hybrid system, the issues of non-determinism must be resolved. If there are
several enabled actions for a given state in an execution, one must be chosen
via a consistent policy. Possible policies include (i) event chosen independent
of execution history, or (oblivious), (ii) event dependent on current state, or
(Markovian) (iii) event chosen dependent on execution history, or (history-
dependent). Extensive work has been done regarding the ﬁrst policy [11].
We consider the implementation of a Markovian policy in the context of a
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partially observable probabilistic hybrid automata framework, which we call
a Hybrid Hidden Markov Model (HHMM). This framework arose through
the consideration of the distributed air traﬃc management problem, where
individual airplanes (agents) have full information of their own state and
model, but only partial information regarding their neighbors’ states. We
utilize the HHMM formalism to address the problem of self-separation of
aircraft along a parametrized route in the included example.
1.5 Decentralized Conﬂict Avoidance
In the decentralized air traﬃc system, each aircraft talks to its closest neigh-
bors, i.e., it has the ﬂight data of its neighboring aircraft. Since there are
data dropouts, uncertainties in the data, an unknown time-varying number of
maneuvering aircraft and unknown identities, the assumption of full observ-
ability does not stand. At each time instant, each aircraft detects potential
conﬂicts with its neighboring aircraft and then makes a decision to resolve
conﬂicts. The combination of probabilistic uncertain dynamics and proba-
bilistic observability yields the probability distribution over the state which
is called a belief state.
The mathematical deﬁnition of the decentralized conﬂict detection algo-
rithm for an aircraft, represented by an HIOA, which then receives as inputs
the position, velocity and heading of all aircraft within sensor range, allows
for the aircraft in question to run HHMMs of each aircraft, and to proba-
bilistically predict what mode of the HIOA each sensed aircraft has engaged.
This allows for proactive conﬂict detection and resolution maneuvers that can
be enacted by each aircraft, without involving overt communication between
aircraft.
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1.6 Thesis Outline
In the next chapter, a literature review of the state of the art techniques
in stochastic hybrid modeling, probabilistic conﬂict detection and intent in-
formation are outlined. Chapter four provides the theoretical background
for Hidden Markov Modeling, and the types of problems best suited for this
formalism. The hybrid hidden Markov model (HHMM) is introduced chap-
ter ﬁve along with presenting the HIOA and PTIOA frameworks and their
properties. A description of the air traﬃc data and sector area being used is
given in chapter six. The model which uses intent information in the HHMM
is described here as well. The models derived and their eﬃcacy as well as the
comparison between HMM and other approaches are then discussed in this
chapter. In chapter seven, a decentralized conﬂict avoidance algorithm using
the HHMM framework and the HIOA language is developed. Conclusions
and future work are outlined in chapter eight.
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Chapter 2
Survey of the Field
2.1 Probabilistic Conﬂict Detection
Algorithms
In this section we present a brief review of some of the work done in proba-
bilistic conﬂict detection. Kuchar and Yang [12] present an excellent survey
of over 60 diﬀerent conﬂict detection and resolution schemes, where these
methods are classiﬁed according to a taxonomy that includes dimensions of
state (vertical, horizontal or both), prediction methods (nominal, worst-case
or probabilistic), conﬂict detection threshold, conﬂict resolution methods and
maneuvers, and conﬂict management (pairwise or global).
Carpenter and Kuchar [13] have developed a prototype airborne collision
alerting logic for aircraft on approach to closely-spaced parallel runways.
The alerting decision is based on the estimated probability of a collision
(using a series of Monte Carlo simulations), in contrast to using a standard
spatial or temporal alerting criterion (Traﬃc Alert and Collision Avoidance
System (TCAS) or Precision Runway Monitoring (PRM)) to avoid large time
delays and also unacceptable false alert rates. The authors have developed a
dynamic model of aircraft on approach that includes uncertainties in sensor
measurement and in the intentions of the aircraft. In this model having
knowledge of the relative position, speed, heading and turn rate of parallel
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traﬃc is important to determine whether a situation is hazardous. Here the
threatened aircraft follows a normal approach path while the intruder follows
either a normal or a blunder approach path. In case of an alert, the climbing-
turn maneuver is initiated. Since this is an airborne probabilistic logic, as
the authors mention, the pilot may have some diﬃculties in understanding
why alerts occur. This may result in a lack of trust in the system, hence a
decrease in its eﬃciency.
Paielli and Erzberger [14,15] present a method that accurately estimates
the probability of conﬂict for aircraft pairs in free ﬂight. They make two
important assumptions: First, the prediction errors are approximated as
normally distributed. Hence, the two error covariances of the aircraft pair
can be combined into a single covariance of their relative position. Paielli
and Erzberger [14,15] assign this combined covariance to one of the aircraft,
referred to as the stochastic aircraft, while the other aircraft (reference air-
craft) is regarded to have no positional uncertainty. Secondly, it is assumed
that the planned velocities and prediction errors of both aircraft are constant
throughout the encounter or the period of potential conﬂict. The probability
of conﬂict is then determined as the intersection of the ellipse corresponding
to the combined error covariance and the circular conﬂict zone (5 nmi radius).
By projecting the circular conﬂict zone along a line parallel to the relative
velocity, an extended conﬂict zone is formed. The total probability of the
encounter is the intersection of the combined error ellipse and this extended
conﬂict zone. With a coordinate transformation the combined error ellipse
transforms into a unit circle, which simpliﬁes the probability computation
and leads to an analytical computation of the total probability of conﬂict,
which in turn can be used to ﬁnd the optimal time to initiate a resolution
maneuver. Paielli [16] tests the conﬂict detection scheme proposed in Ref. 14
12
using actual ﬂight data, considering only aircraft pairs in level ﬂight over
FL290.
Blin et al. [17] propose diﬀerent aircraft position error models that they
tune by reproducing the results obtained in Ref. 14, 15. Their models are
based on three considerations: (1) a position error normally distributed with
a constant rate that grows linearly with time, (2) a position error result-
ing from a velocity error modeled as a Brownian process, and (3) a position
error resulting from an acceleration error modeled as a Brownian process.
According to the authors, a combination of these three models is a possi-
ble solution. This new position error model is generic and can be used for
diﬀerent probabilistic methods. In Ref. 18 the authors have developed an
environment to quantitatively evaluate and compare three diﬀerent conﬂict
detection algorithms (geometric, probabilistic and enhanced probabilistic).
They use minimum horizontal separation expansion and altitude shift to cre-
ate conﬂicts with real air traﬃc data. Like Ref. 16, the authors develop their
prediction error model with simple trajectory prediction, i.e., straight paths
at constant speed. It is shown that the modiﬁcations to the error model of
Ref. 14 proposed in Ref. 17 result in a decrease of the missed detection rate
while maintaining the false alarm rate.
Prandini et al. [19] present a decentralized algorithm for CD&R. In this
model, randomized optimization is used for estimating the criticality mea-
sure, that is, the maximum instantaneous probability of conﬂict, and for-
mulating a conﬂict detection algorithm for two aircraft encounters. The
advantage of randomized techniques is that they tend to be computationally
eﬃcient.
Hwang et al. [20] use the trajectory prediction error model proposed in
Ref. 14 to develop a conﬂict detection algorithm which is based on hybrid
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models of aircraft. For ﬂight mode estimates they propose a modiﬁed version
of the Interacting Multiple Model (IMM) algorithm [21, 22] called Residual
Mean IMM. This work is restricted to two dimensions.
2.2 Stochastic Hybrid Systems (SHS)
Due to the inherent uncertainty existing in real world problems, stochastic
hybrid and switched modeling formalisms [8,23–25] are prevalent in the rep-
resentation of physical systems. Stochastic hybrid systems arise in numerous
applications of systems with multiple nodes, such as ﬂexible manufacturing
system, air traﬃc management, etc. This idea is not new and many models of
stochastic hybrid systems have been proposed (see Ref. [26] for an overview).
The major point of distinction lies in the manner in which the randomness
or stochasticity is incorporated into the model.
One choice in modeling stochastic hybrid systems is to replace the deter-
ministic dynamics by a stochastic diﬀerential equation. In this case, starting
from a ﬁxed initial state, depending on the solutions of the stochastic equa-
tions, diﬀerent guards can be activated. Hence diﬀerent discrete transitions
occur randomly, although the discrete state is deterministic [27].
Another choice is to replace the deterministic transitions between discrete
states by random ones governed by some prescribed probabilistic law. Two
types of discrete transitions are studied in diﬀerent models. The ﬁrst occur
at the boundaries of the state space, where continuous evolution becomes
impossible. These transitions are called forced transitions. The second class
of transitions, known as spontaneous transitions, can take place in the interior
of the state space at random times (e.g. using a generalized Poisson process)
[24].
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Some stochastic hybrid models allow diﬀusion to model continuous evolu-
tion (Switched Diﬀusion Processes [28, 29]; Stochastic Hybrid Systems [27])
while others do not (e.g. Piecewise Deterministic Markov Processes [30]).
Some models only allow forced transitions [27], others allow random time
transitions [28], while still others allow both. Next, some stochastic hybrid
models are reviewed.
2.2.1 Piecewise Deterministic Markov Processes
(PDMP)
Piecewise Deterministic Markov Processes (PDMP) are a model of stochastic
hybrid systems in which randomness occurs only in the discrete transitions.
The evolution of the continuous state is according to a deterministic nonlinear
diﬀerential equation, but transitions occur either when the state hits the
state space boundary (guards), or according to a generalized Poisson process.
After each transition the hybrid system is reset instantaneously according to a
probability distribution which depends on the state before the transition [29].
2.2.2 Switched Diﬀusion Process (SDP)
A controlled switching diﬀusion is an example of a hybrid system that arises
in numerous applications like fault-tolerant control systems, multiple tar-
get tracking and ﬂexible manufacturing systems. The continuous state is
governed by a stochastic diﬀerential equation (controlled diﬀusion process),
while the discrete state is a controlled Markov chain which its transition
matrix depends on the continuous state. Also the continuous state jumps at
random times. The characteristic feature of SDP is that the continuous state
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evolves without jumps, i.e. it can be assumed to be a continuous function of
time [24, 28].
2.2.3 Polynomial Stochastic Hybrid Systems (PSHS)
Stochastic Hybrid Systems (SHS) are a class of nonlinear stochastic contin-
uous time hybrid dynamical systems. They are characterized by a hybrid
state deﬁned by continuous and discrete states. The continuous state evolves
according to a stochastic diﬀerential equation that depends on the hybrid
state. The discrete dynamics produces transitions in both continuous and
discrete states. Transitions are either forced or spontaneous. After each tran-
sition, the hybrid state is reset instantaneously to a new value according to a
probability law depending on the pre-jump location. This class allows diﬀu-
sion processes in the continuous evolution, spontaneous discrete transitions,
forced transitions, and probabilistic reset of the hybrid state as a result of
discrete transitions [30].
PSHS generally correspond to stochastic SHS with polynomial continuous
vector ﬁelds, reset maps, and transition intensities. For this model both the
continuous and the discrete component of the hybrid state are stochastic
processes. The evolution of the continuous state is determined by a stochastic
diﬀerential equation and the discrete state is governed by a transition or
reset map. These discrete transitions are triggered by stochastic events (like
transitions in PDMP) [25].
Although SHS can model large classes of systems, their formal analysis
presents signiﬁcant challenges, such as having an analytical solution for the
partial diﬀerential equations that express the evolution of the probability
distribution function for the states. But in the PSHS model, an inﬁnite
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vector is created that contains the probabilities of all discrete modes and the
multi-variable statistical moment of the continuous state. The dynamics of
this vector are governed by an inﬁnite-dimensional linear ordinary diﬀerential
equation. It is shown in Ref. [25] that these linear ODEs can sometimes be
approximated by a ﬁnite-dimensional nonlinear ODE with relative precision.
2.3 Intent Information
In predicting the potential of future loss of separation between two aircraft
it is imperative to know the respective intentions of the aircraft (e.g., will
they continue on their present straight-line trajectories, or will one or both
change altitudes and/or headings, etc.). Human controllers may infer aircraft
intentions from the ﬁled ﬂight plans but also possess large amounts of intent
information from their communications with pilots as well as their own plan-
ning processes. The latter two sources of information are clearly extremely
valuable in this task due to their greater immediacy and because ﬂight plans
are frequently changed via voice communications, based on controllers’ ac-
tive planning of traﬃc ﬂows. Automated systems have access to ﬂight plan
information but not to moment-to-moment information exchanges between
controllers and pilots via voice radio, and obviously not to controllers’ covert
planning processes, and therefore are in certain disadvantage compared to
human controllers.
Some CD&R algorithms have used intent information to predict the fu-
ture position of an aircraft. These algorithms may use diﬀerent types of
intent information. Predeﬁned ﬂight plans and ATC clearances are called
implicit intent information. Implicit intent is available via a ﬁled ﬂight plan,
and/or communications between the ATC controller and the pilot. Infor-
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mation exchange between two or more aircraft or between aircraft and ATC
through digital data link provides the explicit form of intent. The Flight
Management System (FMS) ﬂight plans are explicit intent. FMS route in-
formation consists of the position of each waypoint, the estimated speed at
each waypoint and the estimated time of arrival at each waypoint.
In Ref. 31 the initial set of explicit intent information, transferred via
data link between aircraft, required to perform conﬂict detection is described.
Kuchar and Yang [32] describe some of the fundamental issues that arise in
CD&R problems involving intent by developing a generalized model of con-
ﬂict detection when intent information is available. Their model is composed
of a strategic model (economic-based) and a tactical one (safety-based).
In Ref. 33 a method to compute the probability of conﬂict in the pres-
ence of intent information and trajectory uncertainties is described. This
approach relies on Monte Carlo simulations using a series of straight-line
trajectories.They use a series of Monte Carlo simulations for various trajec-
tory errors and intent information.
Carreno and Munoz [34] present an intent based conﬂict detection algo-
rithm as well. They use published data to predict aircraft future locations.
Their intent based conﬂict detection algorithm utilizes intent projection when
the aircraft is on a nominal path, otherwise it reverts to state projection when
the aircraft diverts from its nominal path by more than a predeterminded
margin. This algorithm reduces the number of false alarms as opposed to
state based conﬂict detection algorithms.
Zhao et al. [35] propose several classiﬁcations of pilot intent models. They
specify four groups of intent parameters: motive intent, objective intent,
trajectory intent, and cost intent. Motive intent can be used to predict
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aircraft trajectories in a short time, in turn objective intent can reduce the
number of false alarms when used in tactical CD&R aids.
Conformance monitoring in air traﬃc control is required to detect de-
viations of aircraft from their assigned trajectories. This promotes safety,
security, and eﬃciency. In Ref. 36 fault detection techniques are used for
conformance monitoring, where non-conforming behavior of an aircraft is
considered a fault. Use of this approach and the insight gained through it
is demonstrated by simple implementations of the framework with ﬂight-test
data.
Krozel and Andrisani [37] present a method for inferring the intent of a
pilot in real time. Their method is based on artiﬁcial intelligence and links
weather state information, special-use airspace region boundaries and other
factors to the inferred intent. This technique can be used for conformance
monitoring as well but has not been extended to this application as of yet.
19
Chapter 3
Hidden Markov Models
A hidden Markov model (HMM) has two stochastic components: a ﬁnite-
state Markov chain and a ﬁnite set of output probability distributions. In
other words an unobservable stochastic process (hidden) that can only be ob-
served through another set of stochastic processes that generate the sequence
of observations.
The basic theory of HMMs was introduced in the late 1960s by Baum and
his colleagues [38–41]. In the classic paper of L.R. Rabiner [9] an introduction
to the theory of HMMs and their application in speech recognition has been
presented. In this work, an example of an HMM is introduced where there
is a collection of N urns, each containing a diﬀerent proportion of colored
balls with M possible colors for each ball. The observation sequence occurs
by choosing a new urn based on only the previously chosen urn, and then
choosing with replacement a ball from this new urn. The ball choices are
observable but the sequence of urn choices are hidden.
HMMs are currently being used in automatic speech recognition [42–
44], language modeling [45, 46], biological sequence analysis [47], network
intrusion detection systems [48, 49] and various other applications.
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3.1 Discrete Markov Processes
Consider a system with a set of N states, S = {s1, s2, . . . , sN}. At any given
time, the system is in one of the states and moves to another state in the
next time step according to a set of probabilities associated with the state.
If the process is a ﬁrst order Markov chain, the transition probability does
not depend upon which states the chain was in before the current state, i.e.,
aij = P {qt+1 = j |qt = i} , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N
The state transition probabilities have the following properties:
aij ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N
M∑
k=1
aij = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
Since the output of the process is the set of states at each instant of
time and each state corresponds to a physical, i.e., observable, event, this
stochastic process can be called an observable Markov model.
3.2 Hidden Markov Model
The Hidden Markov Model [9,42,50–53] is comprised of a ﬁnite set of states,
each of which is associated with a (generally multidimensional) probability
distribution. Transitions among the states are governed by a set of prob-
abilities called transition probabilities. In a particular state an outcome or
observation can be generated, according to the associated probability distri-
bution. It is only the outcome, not the state, that is visible to an external
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observer: therefore the states of the system are hidden from the observer,
hence the name Hidden Markov Model.
In order to deﬁne the HMM completely, the following ﬁve elements are
needed:
1) The number of states of the model, N (although the states are hidden).
2) The number of distinct observation symbols per state, i.e, the discrete
alphabet size, M . If the observations are continuous then M is inﬁnite.
3) The state transition matrix, Λ = {aij}, and the set of state transition
probabilities,
aij = P {qt+1 = j |qt = i} , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N
where qt denotes the current state. Transition probabilities should satisfy
the normal stochastic constraints,
aij ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N and
M∑
k=1
aij = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
4) A probability distribution in each of the states, B = {bj(k)} where
bj(k) = P {ot = vk |qt = j} , 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ M ,
where vk denotes the k
th observation symbol in the alphabet, and ot is the
current observation. The following stochastic constraints must be satisﬁed.
bj(k) ≥ 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ M and
M∑
k=1
bj(k) = 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ N.
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5)The initial state distribution, Π = {πi} where,
πi = P {q1 = i} , 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Therefore we can use the compact notation λ = (Λ, B,Π) to denote an
HMM with discrete probability distributions.
3.2.1 The three basic problems for HMMs
There are three basic problems for HMMs that are useful in real-world ap-
plications. Given the model parameters, the evaluation problem involves
computing the probability of a particular output sequence and is solved us-
ing the forward algorithm. The decoding problem entails determining the
hidden sequence most likely to have generated a sequence of observations,
and is solved by the Viterbi algorithm. In the learning problem, the model
parameters that are most likely to have generated a sequence of observations
are determined using the Baum-Welch algorithm.
1) Given a model λ = (Λ, B,Π) and the observation sequence O =
o1o2 . . . oT , how do we eﬃciently compute the probability of the observation
sequence, P {O |λ}?
2) Given a model λ = (Λ, B,Π) and the observation sequence O =
o1o2 . . . oT , what is the most likely state sequence in the model, Q = q1q2 . . . qT
that produces the observations?
3) Given a model λ = (Λ, B,Π) and the observation sequence O =
o1o2 . . . oT , how should we adjust the model parameters in order to maxi-
mize P {O |λ}?
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3.2.2 The Decoding Problem and the Viterbi
Algorithm
The solution to the decoding problem depends upon the way the ”most likely
state sequence” is deﬁned. One approach is to ﬁnd the most likely state qt
at time t and to concatenate all such qt’s. However this method does not
necessarily give a physically meaningful state sequence. Therefore we use
another method, commonly known as the Viterbi algorithm, where the entire
state sequence with the maximum likelihood is found. In order to facilitate
this computation, we deﬁne an auxiliary variable, which gives the highest
probability that a partial observation sequence and state sequence up to
time t can have, given that the current state is i.
δt(i) = max
q1q2···qt−1
P {q1, q2, · · · , qt−1, qt = i, o1, o2, · · · , ot−1 |λ} (3.1)
It is easy to observe that the following recursive relationship holds.
δt+1(i) = bj(ot+1)
[
max
1≤i≤N
δt(i)aij
]
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, (3.2)
where, δ1(j) = πjbj(o1), 1 ≤ j ≤ N .
So, the procedure to ﬁnd the most likely state sequence starts from the
calculation of δT (j), 1 ≤ j ≤ N , and the state j∗, is found where
j∗ = arg max
1≤j≤N
δT (j). (3.3)
The sequence of states is then back-tracked to ﬁnd the most likely.
This whole algorithm can be interpreted as a search in a graph whose
nodes are formed by the states of the HMM in each of the time instants
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t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
3.2.3 The Learning Problem
Generally, the learning problem involves adjusting the HMM parameters, so
that the given set of observations (called the training set) is represented by
the model in the best possible way for the intended application. Thus it is
clear that the ”quantity” we wish to optimize during the learning process
diﬀers depending on the nature of the application. In other words, there
may be several optimization criteria for learning, out of which a suitable one
is selected depending on the application.
There are two main optimization criteria found in the literature; Maxi-
mum Likelihood (ML) and Maximum Mutual Information (MMI). The so-
lution to the learning problem under the Maximum Likelihood method is
described below.
In ML we try to maximize the probability of a given sequence of obser-
vations Ow, belonging to a given class w, given the HMM λw of the class w,
with respect to the parameters of the model λw. This probability is the total
likelihood of the observations and can be expressed mathematically as
Ltot = P {Ow |λw } . (3.4)
Since we consider only one class w at a time, we can drop the subscript
and superscript w’s.
However, there is no known way to analytically solve for the model
λ = (Λ, B, π), which maximizes the quantity Ltot. Nonetheless, we can
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choose model parameters such that it is locally maximized, using an iter-
ative procedure, like the Baum-Welch method, which is described below.
This method can be derived using simple ”occurrence counting” argu-
ments, or using calculus to maximize the auxiliary quantity
Q(λ, λ¯) =
∑
q
P {q |O, λ} log [P {O, q, λ¯}] . (3.5)
A special feature of this algorithm is that it is guaranteed to converge.
To describe the Baum-Welch algorithm, also known as the Forward-
Backward algorithm, we deﬁne two auxiliary variables, in terms of the clas-
sical forward and backward variables, αt(i) and βt(j) respectively.
αt(i) = P {o1, · · · , ot, qt = i |λ} (3.6)
αt+1(i) =
N∑
i=1
αt(i)aijbj(ot+1) 1 ≤ j ≤ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 (3.7)
βt(j) = P {ot+1, · · · , oT |qt = j, λ} (3.8)
βt(j) =
N∑
j=1
aijbj(ot+1)βt+1(j) 1 ≤ i ≤ N , t = T − 1, T − 2, · · · (3.9)
The ﬁrst variable is deﬁned as the probability of being in state i at time
t and in state j at time t + 1. Formally,
ξt(i, j) = P {qt = i, qt+1 = j |O, λ} . (3.10)
This is the same as,
ξt(i, j) =
P {qt = i, qt+1 = j |λ}
P {O |λ} . (3.11)
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Using forward and backward variables this can be expressed as,
ξt(i, j) =
αt(i)aijβt+1(j)bj(ot+1)∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 αt(i)aijβt+1(j)bj(ot+1)
. (3.12)
The second variable is the a posteriori probability,
γt(i) = P {qt = i |O, λ} , (3.13)
that is the probability of being in state i at time t, given the observation
sequence and the model. In forward and backward variables this can be
expressed by,
γt(i) =
αt(i)βt(i)∑N
i=1 αt(i)βt(i)
. (3.14)
One can see that the relationship between γt(i) and ξt(i, j) is given by,
γt(i) =
N∑
j=1
ξt(i, j), 1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ t ≤ M. (3.15)
Now it is possible to describe the Baum-Welch learning process, where
parameters of the HMM are updated in such a way as to maximize the
quantity, P {O |λ}. Assuming a starting model λ = (Λ, B, π), we recursively
calculate and update the HMM parameters according to Eqs. 3.16-3.18,
known as re-estimation formulae.
π¯i = γ1(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ N (3.16)
a¯ij =
∑T−1
t=1 ξt(i, j)∑T−1
t=1 γt(i)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ j ≤ N (3.17)
b¯j(k) =
∑T
t=1,ot=vk
γt(j)∑T
t=1 γt(i)
, 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ M (3.18)
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The Baum-Welch algorithm is guaranteed to converge, thereby ﬁnding a
local maxima.
If we now allow the states of the HMM to be represented by continuous,
probabilistic functions, the models become Hybrid Hidden Markov Models
(HHMM) which are described in the next chapter.
28
Chapter 4
Hybrid Hidden Markov Models
In the previous chapter, we studied hidden Markov models. If we now allow
the states of the HMM to be represented by continuous, probabilistic func-
tions, the models become Hybrid Hidden Markov Models (HHMM). Thus,
an HHMM can be used in conjunction with past ﬂight data in a TRACON
in order to model the conformance of aircraft to ﬂight paths, or to detect
when individual aircraft change their mode of ﬂight (e.g. when an aircraft
changes its ﬂight path from steady level ﬂight, to climbing ﬂight etc.).
4.1 Hybrid Automata
A hybrid automaton is a state machine whose states can change by discrete
transitions, which result in an instantaneous change of state, or by continuous
trajectories, which express the evolution of the state over time intervals.
Deﬁnition 4.1.1 A hybrid automaton, HA, is composed of the seven-tuple:
HA = (W,X,Q,Θ, E,H,D, T ) (4.1)
where,
• The sets W and X are disjoint from each other and correspond to
external and internal variables, respectively. The set of variables is
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deﬁned as V = W
⋃
X.
• Q represents the set of states, Q ⊂ val(X).
• Θ is the non-empty set of start states, Θ ⊆ Q.
• The set of actions Ac consists of a set E of external actions and a set
H of internal actions which are disjoint from each other.
• The set D, of discrete transitions, D ⊆ Q × Ac × Q, is often denoted
in shorthand by x
a→ x′. If x a→ x′, it is said that a is enabled in x.
• T is the set of trajectories for V . For a trajectory τ ∈ T , the ﬁrst
and last (if τ is closed) states are denoted by τ.fstate and τ.lstate
respectively. The set T satisﬁes the following closure properties.
– P1 Preﬁx Closure: For every τ ∈ T and every preﬁx τ ′ of τ ,
τ
′ ∈ T .
– P2 Suﬃx Closure: For every τ ∈ T and every suﬃx τ ′ of τ , τ ′ ∈ T .
– P3 Concatenation Closure: If τ0, τ1, · · · ∈ T is a sequence of trajec-
tories such that τi.lstate = τi+1.fstate, then their concatenation
is also in T .
These closure properties are needed for parallel composition of hybrid
automata. In a composed system, any trajectory of any automaton can be
interrupted at any time by a discrete transition of another automaton. Preﬁx
closure ensures that the part of trajectory up to the transition is a trajectory,
while the remainder being a trajectory is guaranteed by suﬃx closure. And
ﬁnally the concatenation closure is required so that the automaton can follow
changes in its continuous dynamics.
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Note: Each variable (a component of the system’s state) v is associated
with a static type and a dynamic type. The static type of v, type(v), is the
set of values that v can take. val(V ) is the set of all valuations of V and a
valuation is a function that associates for each v ∈ V a value in type(v).
4.1.1 Executions and Traces
Execution fragments and traces are used to describe the behavior of the
automata. An execution fragment of a hybrid automaton is an (Ac, V )-
sequence (action-trajectory sequence)
α = τ0a1τ1a2τ2 · · · (4.2)
where
• Each τi ∈ T
• Each ai ∈ Ac
• If τi is not the last trajectory in α, then the last state in τi can
map, under some action ai+1, to a ﬁrst state in some trajectory τi+1;
τi.lstate
ai+1→ τi+1.fstate.
An execution fragment records all the details of a particular run of a
system, including all the discrete state changes and also the changes to the
state and external variables as time advances. The set of execution fragments
of HA is denoted by fragsHA. An execution fragment α is called an execution
if the ﬁrst state of α is a start state of the hybrid automaton HA. The set
of executions of HA is deﬁned as execsHA.A state of the hybrid automaton
is reachable if it is the last state of some execution of the automaton. An
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invariant property (or an invariant) is a predicate on the state variables that
is true in all reachable states.
Traces capture the externally visible behavior of a hybrid automaton.
Traces record external actions and the trajectories that describe the evolution
of external variables. The trace of an execution fragment α, trace(α), is the
(E,W )-restriction of α, i.e., the restriction of α to the external actions and
external variables. A trace fragment of a hybrid automaton HA, from a state
x of HA, is the trace of an execution fragment of HA whose ﬁrst state is x.
A trace of HA is the trace of an execution of HA. The set of traces of HA
is deﬁned as tracesHA.
Deﬁnition 4.1.2 Hybrid automata HA1 and HA2 are said to be compara-
ble if W1 = W2 and E1 = E2, i.e., they have the same external interface.
Furthermore, if HA1 and HA2 are comparable, then HA1 implements HA2
if tracesHA1 ⊆ tracesHA2.
4.1.2 Composition
Parallel composition is an operation on hybrid automata, which allows an
automaton representing a complex system to be constructed by composing
automata representing individual system components. The composition op-
eration in Ref. 10 identiﬁes external actions with the same name in diﬀerent
component automata, and likewise for external variables. When any compo-
nent automaton performs a discrete step which involves an action a, all the
other automata that have a in their action sets do the same. Similarly, when
any component automaton performs a trajectory which involves a particular
evolution of values for an external variable v, then all the other automata
that have v in their variable set do the same.
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In Ref. 10, composition is deﬁned as a partial, binary operation on hybrid
automata. Since internal actions of an automaton HA1 are intended to be
unobservable by any other automaton HA2, HA1 is composed with HA2
only if the internal actions of HA1 are disjoint from the actions of HA2.
Likewise, disjointness of the internal variables of HA1 and the variables of
HA2 is required.
Deﬁnition 4.1.3 Hybrid automata HA1 and HA2 are said to be compatible
if H1 ∩ A2 = H2 ∩ A1 = ∅ and X1 ∩ V2 = X2 ∩ V1 = ∅.
Deﬁnition 4.1.4 If HA1 and HA2 are compatible, then their composition
HA1 ‖HA2 is deﬁned to be the structure HA = (W,X,Q,Θ, E,H,D, T )
where:
• W = W1 ∪W2 and X = X1 ∪X2.
• Q = {x ∈ val(X) |(xrestrictedtoX1) ∈ Q1 ∧ (xrestrictedtoX2) ∈ Q2} .
• Θ = {x ∈ val(X) |(xrestrictedtoX1) ∈ Θ1 ∧ (xrestrictedtoX2) ∈ Θ2} .
• E = E1 ∪ E2 and H = H1 ∪H2.
• For each x, x′ ∈ Q and each a ∈ A, x aA→ x′ iﬀ for i = 1, 2, either
– a ∈ Ai and xrestrictedtoXi ai→ x′restrictedtoXi or
– a /∈ Ai and xrestrictedtoXi = x′restrictedtoXi.
• T ⊆ trajs(V ) is given by τ ∈ T ⇔ τrestrictedtoV1 ∈ T1∧τrestrictedtoV2 ∈
T2.
.
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The next theorem states that the class of hybrid automata is closed under
composition.
Theorem 4.1.5 If HA1 and HA2 are hybrid automata, then HA1 ‖HA2 is
a hybrid automaton.
The proof is found in Ref. 10. A projection lemma derived from this
theorem states that the executions of a composition of hybrid automata
project to give the executions of the component automata.
4.2 Hybrid Input/Output Automata
(HIOA)
HIOAs are used in description and analysis of hybrid systems. This model
is based on the concept of inﬁnite state machines whose states can change
by discrete actions or by continuous trajectories [10]. The HIOA model is
a reﬁnement of the hybrid automaton where external actions and variables
consist of input and output actions and variables.
Deﬁnition 4.2.1 A hybrid input/output automaton A = (HA,U, Y, I, O)
consists of
• A hybrid automaton HA (4.1).
• A set U of input variables and a set Y of output variables, W = U
⋃
Y .
As before, V = W
⋃
X. The set Z = X
⋃
Y is called the set of locally
controlled variables.
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• A set I of input actions and a set O of output actions, E = I
⋃
O.
As before Ac = E
⋃
H. The actions in the set L = H
⋃
O are called
locally controlled actions.
In Addition A satisﬁes:
• E1 Input Action Enabling: For every x ∈ Q and a ∈ I, there exists
x
′ ∈ Q such that x a→ x′ .
• E2 Input Trajectory Enabling: A should be able to accept any trajec-
tory for the input variables.
Input trajectory enabling states that an HIOA should be able to accept
any trajectory, i.e., any trajectory for the input variables, either by letting
time advance for the entire duration of the input trajectory, or by reacting
with a locally controlled action after some part of the input trajectory has
occurred.
An automaton with distinguished inputs and outputs that does not nec-
essarily satisfy the axioms E1 and E2 is called a pre-HIOA.
An execution of a pre-HIOA A is deﬁned to be an execution of HA, and
a trace of A is deﬁned to be a trace of HA. Similarly the execution fragments
and trace fragments of a pre-HIOA are the execution fragments and trace
fragments of the corresponding hybrid automaton.
A pair of HIOAs are comparable if they have the same external interface.
Deﬁnition 4.2.2 Two pre-HIOAs A1 and A2 are comparable if I1 = I2,
O1 = O2, U1 = U2, and Y1 = Y2. If A1 and A2 are comparable then A1
implements A2.
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Since internal actions of an HIOA A1 are intended to be unobservable by
any other HIOA A2, A1 is only allowed to be composed with A2 if the set of
internal actions and variables of A1 are disjoint from the sets of actions and
variables, respectively, of A2. Similarly the disjointness of the sets of output
actions of A∞ and A∈ and disjointness of the sets of output variables of A1
and A2 is required.
Deﬁnition 4.2.3 Pre-HIOAs A1 and A2 are compatible if H1
⋂
Ac2 = H2
⋂
Ac1 =
∅, X1
⋂
V2 = X2
⋂
V1 = ∅ and Y1
⋂
Y2 = O1
⋂
O2. If A1 and A2 are compat-
ible pre-HIOAs, then their composition, A1 ‖A2 , is deﬁned to be the structure
A = (X, Y, U,Q,Θ, H,O, I,D, T ) where
• X = X1
⋃
X2 and Y = Y1
⋃
Y2
• Q = {x ∈ val(X) |xX1 ∈ Q1 ∧ xX2 ∈ Q2}
• Θ = {x ∈ Q |xX1 ∈ Θ1 ∧ xX2 ∈ Θ2}
• H = H1
⋃
H2 and U = (U1
⋃
U2)− Y
• O = O1
⋃
O2 and I = (I1
⋃
I2)− O
• For each x, x′ ∈ Q and each z ∈ Ac, x a→Ac x′ iﬀ for i = 1, 2, either
(1) a ∈ Aci and xXi a→i x′Xi, or (2) a /∈ Ai and xXi.
• T ⊆ trajs(V ) is given by τ ∈ T ⇔ τ ↓ V1 ∈ T1 ∧ τ ↓ V2 ∈ T2.
In general, the composition of two HIOAs A1 and A2 is not necessarily
an HIOA. This happens when the input variables of A1 are output variables
of A2 and vice-versa, and the trajectories of these variables deﬁned by the
automata are inconsistent. Hence, the composed A1 ‖A2 does not satisfy the
input trajectory enabling axiom. Therefore, we have the following weaker
theorem [10].
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Theorem 4.2.4 If A1 and A2 are compatible pre-HIOAs then A1 ‖A2 is a
pre-HIOA.
In the next section we describe the Probabilistic Timed I/O Automata
framework which supports continuous evolution of states through trajecto-
ries, nondeterministic or probabilistic discrete state transitions (which can
be based on continuous distributions), and discrete communications between
components.
4.3 Probabilistic Timed Input/Output
Automata (PTIOA)
A Probabilistic Timed Input/Output AutomatonA = (X, (Q,FQ), x¯, A,D, T )
consists of [11]:
• A set X of internal or state variables.
• A set Q ⊂ val(X) of states, a measurable space (Q,FQ) called the
state space and the start state x¯ ∈ Q.
• Disjoint sets H , I, and O of internal, input and output actions and the
countable set of actions A = H ∪ I ∪ O (L = O ∪H is the set of local
actions and E = O ∪ I is the set of external actions).
• A set D ⊆ Q× A×P(Q,FQ) of probabilistic transitions.
• A deterministic set T of trajectories for Q which is closed under preﬁx,
suﬃx, and concatenation.
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This closure property is needed for parallel composition of PTIOA, where
any trajectory of any automaton can be interrupted at any time by a proba-
bilistic transition of another automaton. Preﬁx closure ensures that the part
of the trajectory up to the transition is a trajectory, while the remainder
being a trajectory is guaranteed by suﬃx closure. Concatenation closure
ensures that the automaton can follow changes in its continuous dynamics.
It should be noted that unlike HIOAs, PTIOAs do not have external
variables (W = U∪Y ) and it is assumed that they communicate only through
shared actions.
Execution fragments and traces are used to describe the behavior of the
automata. An execution fragment is an alternating sequence of actions and
trajectories which shows all the changes to the state and external variables
(in the case of the HIOA) and all discrete state changes while time advances.
Traces capture the externally visible behavior of the hybrid automaton and
for a PTIOA record the external actions and duration of the intervening time
intervals. Hence, the trace of α, trace(α), is the (E, ∅)-restriction of α.
In the PTIOA framework there are probability measures over the set
of executions and traces which in the HHM framework translates into the
probability distribution in each of the states.
Deﬁnition 4.3.1 [11] Pre-PTIOAs A1 and A2 are compatible if X1
⋂
X2 =
H1
⋂
A2 = H2
⋂
A1 = O1
⋂
O2 = ∅. If A1 and A2 are compatible pre-
PTIOAs, then their composition, A1 ‖A2 , is deﬁned to be the structure A =
(X, (Q,FQ), x¯, A,D, T ) where
• X = X1
⋃
X2 and (Q,FQ) = (Q1 ×Q2,FQ1 ⊗ FQ1), and x¯ = (x¯1, x¯2)
• A = A1
⋃
A2, O = O1
⋃
O2, I = (I1
⋃
I2)− O and H = H1
⋃
H2
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• D ⊆ Q×A× P (Q,FQ) is the set of ((x1, x2), a, μ1 ⊗ μ2) such that for
i ∈ {1, 2} if a ∈ Ai then (xi, a, μi) ∈ Di, otherwise μi = δxi
• T ⊆ trajs(V ) is given by τ ∈ T ⇔ τ ↓ X1 ∈ T1 ∧ τ ↓ X2 ∈ T2.
Theorem 4.3.2 If A1 and A2 are pre-PTIOAs then A1 ‖A2 is a pre-PTIOA.
4.4 Partially Observable Markov Decision
Processes
A Markov decision process (MDP) is a framework for sequential decision
making in a stochastic environment, which can be used to model an agent’s
synchronous interaction with an environment. In this framework, it is as-
sumed that there is no uncertainty about the agent’s current state. MDPs
have been applied in economics, operations research, control systems design
and artiﬁcial intelligence.
A partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) is an extension
of an MDP, where the state of the system is not fully observable. POMDPs
have been applied in robotics, networked control systems [54], dialogue man-
agement [55] and hazard avoidance alerting systems [56].
Deﬁnition 4.4.1 A POMDP is a tuple (S,A, T,R, Z,O) where [57]
• S is a ﬁnite set of states.
• A is a ﬁnite set of actions.
• T : S × A → Π(S) is the state transition function, where T (s, a, s′) =
P
{
st+1 = s
′ |st = s, at = a
} ∀ s, s′ ∈ S, a ∈ A and Π is the probability
distribution.
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• R : S×A →  is the reward function, that gives the expected immediate
reward gained by taking each action in each state.
• Z is a ﬁnite set of observations.
• O : S × A → Π(Z) is the observation function, where O(s, a, z) =
P {zt = z |st = s, at−1 = a} ∀z ∈ Z, s ∈ S, a ∈ A.
There are two standard approaches to solving POMDP problems [54]. In
the ﬁrst approach the control action at a given time depends explicitly on
the complete history of observations which is called the information state and
grows without bound as time progresses. On the other hand, the combination
of probabilistic uncertain dynamics and probabilistic observability yields the
probability distribution over the state which is called a belief state. In the
second approach, the belief state is viewed as another state variable with its
own state space (belief space).
4.5 Hybrid Hidden Markov Model
In this section, we introduce Hybrid Hidden Markov Models (HHMM) by
mapping the PTIOA framework into hidden Markov models. We utilize this
technique to preserve the Markov property for state transitions, since an air-
craft trajectory can be subdivided into distinct segments, each correspond-
ing to a ﬂight mode, and the switching between ﬂight modes is a ﬁnite-state
Markov process. From a given state x of a PTIOA, multiple actions may
be enabled, and one of these actions is chosen nondeterministically, which in
turn uniquely determines the probabilistic transition at x, and the next state
according to the probability distribution. To resolve the nondeterminism, a
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scheduler is used which can be independent of the history of the execution
(oblivious), history dependent or Markovian.
Conceptually, envision a hidden Markov model that allows for an inﬁnite
number of continuous states (which evolve according to continuous diﬀer-
ential equations) that can be reduced to a discrete number of abstractions
which characterize the modes of the HMM. Using the terminology of the
POMDP and PTIOA, we formally deﬁne the Hybrid Hidden Markov Model
as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.5.1 An HHMM is a tuple (N,M,H, S,B,Π) where:
1. N is the set of states; N = Q ⊂ val(X), where X is a set of internal
or state variables.
2. M = E ∪ W is the union of observable actions deﬁned by the set of
external actions (PTIOA), E = I ∪ O (I and O are the set of input
and output actions, respectively), and the observable part of the state
(POMDP), W .
3. H is the set of internal actions, and A = H ∪ I ∪O.
4. S is the state transition function on the measurable state space (Q,FQ)
given by
st,t+1 = P {qt+1 |qt, at} , qt ∈ val(X(t)), at ∈ A and S = {st,t+1} .
(4.3)
5. B is the distribution on the observable execution trace Tobs = mtmt−1 · · ·mt=0
(where mt = val(M(t)) such that
bt(k) = P {mt = val(E ∪W (t)) |qt = val(X(t))} , k ∈ M , (4.4)
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6. Π = {πi} is the initial distribution of the state given the initial set of
start states Θ
πi = P {q0 = θi, θi ∈ Θ} . (4.5)
Note that the state transition function employs a Markovian selection
process.
If we then consider a simple pictorial description (ﬁgure 4.1) of an aircraft
which alternates between the modes of steady level ﬂight (represented by the
dynamics contained in the circle on the left) and climbing/descending ﬂight
(represented by the dynamics contained in the circle on the right), and the
non-deterministic transition functions described upon the arrows denoting
the random distribution that determines when the system changes modes,
given that the guarding conditions upon the arrow is satisﬁed (since each ep-
silon denotes a small value), one can see the characteristics of a hybrid hidden
Markov model, whose probability distribution on the observable execution
trace is unknown.
Thus, given the HHMM λ and a sequence of observations Tobs, we can
determine the probability that the observations are generated by the model.
Furthermore, given the model λ and a sequence of observations Tobs, we
can determine the most likely state sequence in the model that produces the
observations using a continuous adaptation of the Viterbi Algorithm. Finally,
given a model λ and a sequence of observations Tobs, we can determine how
we should adjust the model parameters λ = (Λ, B,Π) in order to maximize
P {Tobs |λ} using a continuous adaptation of the Baum-Welch Algorithm. An
HHMM can be used in conjunction with actual ﬂight data from a TRACON,
in order to model the conformance of aircraft to ﬂight paths, or to detect
when individual aircraft change their mode of ﬂight (e.g. when an aircraft
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Figure 4.1: Theoretical hybrid hidden Markov model for aircraft in steady
level ﬂight or climbing/descending ﬂight
changes its ﬂight path from steady level ﬂight, to climbing ﬂight etc.).
4.6 Advantages of HHMM to Other
Formalisms
Using HHMMs allows us to look at the aircraft mode identiﬁcation problem as
a hybrid system with continuous variables (trajectories) instead of a discrete
system. This model is most representative of the actual physical evolution of
an aircraft in ﬂight, as it behaves in a continuous manner. When the aircraft
trajectories are modeled as continuous, we have an inﬁnite number of states;
in order to study them we must use a ﬁnite abstraction of the states, which
is enabled by the notion of levels of abstraction (or equivalence classes) in
the HIOA framework. That is why we can use abstract ﬂight modes, such as
steady level ﬂight or accelerating turn, to represent the physical dynamics of
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the aircraft. Also, to extend the work into decentralized CD&R (that is, the
notion that each aircraft has an HHMM onboard and gets information from
its neighboring aircraft), we need these models to be composable, a property
that is guaranteed by using the HIOA framework. The receptiveness property
of the HIOA does not allow the state machine to block time or to contribute
to producing Zeno behavior (inﬁnite number of discrete transitions in a ﬁnite
time).
Modeling the aircraft dynamics as continuous coupled diﬀerential equa-
tions allows us to detect mode changes in a more timely fashion. That is, we
do not have to wait for the next discrete time interval to update our estimate
of the mode of the system. As inputs arrive asynchronously to the HIOA,
the boundary between two modes of ﬂight requires that the ﬁnal valuations
of all continuous variables in the prior mode become the initial values in
the subsequent mode (unless they are overwritten by the triggering input).
The inherent inertia of an HHMM is suﬃciently less than that of its equiva-
lent HMM (which is essentially a predictive altitude threshold model). That
is, the HHMM is better able to model, then distinguish, between changes
attributed to noise and/or disturbances, as opposed to actual changes in
commanded ﬂight paths. This is because the HHMM formalism allows for
the incorporation of continuous, stochastic elements, such as random walks
(wind disturbances) and Gaussian noise.
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Chapter 5
Mode Detection Results
5.1 Aircraft Flight Data
We have used two diﬀerent sets of real ﬂight data, NDMS data and FEWS
data, in the evaluation of the HHMM framework.
The FAA System Analysis Recording (SAR) stores all ﬂight and radar
information in Air Route Traﬃc Control Centers (ARTCCs). The SAR data
are reduced into reports generated by two computer programs, the Data
Analysis Reduction Tool (DART) and National Track Analysis Program
(NTAP). A National Airspace System (NAS) Host computer can generate
these reports. The NAS Data Management System (NDMS) was developed
to organize the text-based NTAP reports into hour-long Microsoft Access
database ﬁles [58]. Traﬃc samples used in this paper are from the Indi-
anapolis ARTCC (ZID) for both busy and slow times of day. Each ﬁle of
the database corresponds to a single aircraft with the aircraft identiﬁer as
its name. The data in the ﬁles are recorded approximately every six seconds
and include
• Digital time (ZULU) in hhmmss format
• Position of the aircraft and its altitude
• Ground speed
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• Heading angle
• Assigned altitude
• Controlling sector number
The second set of data was obtained from the FAA’s evaluation simula-
tion of Future En route WorkStation (FEWS). The simulations took place
during the summer of 2005 at the Research and Development Human Fac-
tors Laboratory (RDHFL) at the FAA’s Technical Center at Atlantic City
International Airport, NJ. FEWS data includes more information for each
aircraft, and the data are recorded approximately every twelve seconds. The
additional data that we used for our HHMM at each time instant consists
of: true airspeed (kts), indicated airspeed (kts), ﬂight path angle (deg), total
weight of the aircraft (lb), thrust (lb), drag (lb), lift coeﬃcient, desired alt
(ft), desired heading angle (deg) and desired indicated speed (kts).
One of the diﬃculties in predicting aircraft positions is modeling the
uncertainties. Wind and errors in tracking, navigation, and control aﬀect
the future motion of an aircraft. These uncertainties can be modeled as
the sum of a large number of independent random perturbations acting in
disjoint time intervals and, thus, it is expected to be Gaussian [14, 19].
The ﬁdelity of the data does not allow for the use of comprehensive
stochastic models (for wind and/or radar errors). To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is a common occurence in treatise dealing with actual ﬂight data
[16, 59] and is a subject of future work.
The simple linear model used to predict motion along cross-track and
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along-track axes for the NDMS data is given below.
x˙(t) = v(t) sin(π − ψ(t))
y˙(t) = v(t) cos(π − ψ(t)), (5.1)
where x is the position of the aircraft on the along-track axis, y is the position
of the aircraft on the cross-track axis, v(t) is the ground speed of the aircraft
at time t, and ψ(t) is the heading angle of the aircraft at time t.
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Figure 5.1: Position prediction error statistics
To calculate the uncertainty due to Eq. (5.1), the prediction error statis-
tics are computed by using the ﬂight data of 30 aircraft in steady level ﬂight.
A prediction time range of 20 minutes (typical look ahead time for mid-range
conﬂict detection algorithms [19]) is divided into 200 six-second intervals, and
for each interval the mean, standard deviation, and root mean square (rms)
position prediction errors are computed. The rms errors are shown in ﬁgure
5.1. These values can be taken as a bound on uncertainty for the linear
prediction model (Eq. (5.1)), using the aircraft data in order to estimate
future conﬂicts, and agree with the literature [16]. The standard deviation
errors of the along-track and cross-track axes start at 0.154 nmi and 0.19
nmi, respectively, for zero prediction time.
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5.2 The Use of Intent Information
To model the ﬂight path of aircraft by automata (ﬁnite state machines) two
approaches can be taken. In one model each ﬂight mode of aircraft is one
state of the automaton and in the other there are only two states; one corre-
sponding to the horizontal ﬂight modes (the ﬂight modes that do not involve
any altitude changes, e.g., steady level ﬂight, level turn, speed up/down and
etc.) and the other state representing the vertical ﬂight modes (the ﬂight
modes that necessarily include altitude changes, e.g., climb, descend, accel-
erated climb, and etc.). In this paper the second model is used. Figure 5.2
shows this hybrid input/output automaton (HIOA).
Figure 5.2: Aircraft hybrid input/output automata
Explicit intent information can be used in two diﬀerent ways in the
HHMM described before. First it can be used for better mode identiﬁcation.
The predeﬁned ﬂight plans (position of waypoints, etc.) can be interpreted
as ﬂight modes at each time instant. Then the HHMM can use this extra in-
formation to identify the actual modes faster and more accurately. Secondly
intent can be used to determine whether an aircraft is conforming to its ﬂight
plan or not. In this paper intent is used for conformance monitoring.
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We denote the radar measurements (track ﬁles) by x, y, z, θ, φ, ψ, v
which are respectively, positions of aircraft along the longitudinal and lateral
axes, the altitude, pitch (attitude), roll (bank angle), yaw (heading), and
speed. Then by using the HHMM we attempt to ﬁnd the probability of each
sequence of states and choose the path that has the maximum probability.
We call this path Sˆ.
Explicit intent is known via published ﬂight plans and communications
between the controller and the pilot. The published ﬂight plans (which we
call oﬄine intent information) give us the exact sequence of states and the
path of aircraft. We call this sequence S0 and the positions x0, Y0, Z0.
We assume that the communications between the controller and the pilot
(shared information in controller/pilot interactions [60]) only include con-
troller’s commands and we call them online intent information. These com-
mands should allow us to get the deviation between exact oﬄine intent and
the HHMM estimated sequence.
Intent is a continuous variable and HHMMs can be used to carry contin-
uous intent. By using intent information along with the Viterbi algorithm
in the hybrid hidden Markov model we can estimate likely mode transitions
which lead to a better mode identiﬁcation. We will also be able to determine
whether the aircraft are conforming to their predeﬁned ﬂight path or ATC
controller’s commands. Based on the HIOA shown above, we can determine
conformance for vertical and horizontal states separately.
5.3 Mode Detection Results and Discussion
The actual aircraft ﬂight data, described in section 5.1 is used in conjunction
with the HHMM described in the previous chapter, to perform conformance
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monitoring by detecting mode changes in the ﬂight of individual aircraft. If
this model is coupled with the ﬂight plan ﬁled by the aircraft (intent infor-
mation), then the degree of conformance the aircraft exhibits with respect to
its intent can be described probabilistically, by solving the decoding problem.
Alternatively, the ﬂight modes of the aircraft can be described in a stochastic
hybrid setting, and the ﬂight data taken can then be used to train the HHMM
in order to detect transitions between classical modes of ﬂight (i.e., climbing,
climbing turn, level ﬂight, speed-up etc.). This produces an HHMM that
can then be used to give a probabilistic evaluation of the ﬂight mode of an
aircraft after only a few data cycles, in a real-time setting. This latter task is
the focus of this paper, and in the sections below, we describe the parameters
of the trained HMM and HHMM for the ﬂight modes of steady level ﬂight,
climbing/descending ﬂight, turning ﬂight, and climbing/descending turning
ﬂight. The accuracy of the detection of the probabilistic switching function
between these four modes of ﬂight is then discussed.
5.3.1 Parameter Adjustment for Mode Detection
using NDMS Data
In Ref. 61 the altitude data of 30 aircraft, ﬂying initially above FL 260, over a
period of 25 to 65 measurement cycles, were analyzed using the Baum-Welch
algorithm in order to reﬁne the parameters of an HMM for transition detec-
tion between ﬂight modes. These traﬃc samples were from the Indianapolis
ARTCC (ZID) ﬂying in DAY sector during the busy time of day, 21:00-22:00.
Hence, deviation due to aircraft type was not accounted for in the model, as
it is assumed that the class of planes capable of ﬂight at these altitudes is rel-
atively uniform in terms of ﬂight characteristics. Three abstract observation
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classes, comprised of level ﬂight, climbing ﬂight, and descending ﬂight, were
used for the mode detection model, with satisfactory preliminary results.
This simpliﬁed model and its results are used as a benchmark throughout
this section.
(a) Climbing flight (FL 260-290)
(b) Descending flight (FL 290-260)
Figure 5.3: Probability of Level Flight Mode during 10 Training Iterations
In Ref. 62 we divide the aircraft into the following modes: aircraft in
steady level ﬂight, aircraft in descending or climbing ﬂight, and aircraft in
turning ﬂight (using the same aircraft data as in Ref. 61). To capture the
turn mode, the altitude data is insuﬃcient. Hence, the position of the aircraft
on the along-track and cross-track axes, in addition to the altitude, is used
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to distinguish between an aircraft in steady level ﬂight and an aircraft which
is turning in the x− y plane. The heading angle of the aircraft is used as a
reﬁning parameter to improve this metric.
Two aircraft, one in climbing ﬂight and another in descending ﬂight, are
used as illustrative examples to demonstrate the trained HMM’s ability to
detect mode changes, and thus determine the conformance of aircraft. Figure
5.3 shows the convergence of this model during 10 training iterations of the
Baum-Welch algorithm. In this ﬁgure, P(Level) corresponds to the value
of the probability of being in level ﬂight at each time step. Since the data
used in this paper was recorded at six second intervals, each time step in
this ﬁgure stands for six seconds, so the tic-mark corresponding to 7 on the
time axis refers to a time passage of 42 seconds. Here the probability of
being in level ﬂight is plotted for 10 consecutive iterations, where at each
iteration the model processes all the data and adjusts the parameters. The
climbing ﬂight case used 45 measurements (4 min 30 sec) of data, and the
descending ﬂight case used 39 measurements (3 min 48 sec) of data. The
aircraft in ﬁgure 5.3(a) starts climbing from FL260 to FL290 at the 11th
time instant and levels oﬀ when it reaches FL290 at time 186 seconds. This
is clearly illustrated by the pronounced ”U” shape in the graph at the 10th
iteration. But the aircraft shown in ﬁgure 5.3(b) is at ﬁrst in steady level
ﬂight at FL290 and then starts descending to FL260 at the 11th time instant
and levels oﬀ at FL260 at the 31st time step.
The corresponding re-estimated transition and emission probabilities for
both the above scenarios after 10 iterations are given in Table 5.1. For graph-
ical display purposes, we assign a structure using the label ”C” to correspond
to the mode of steady, level ﬂight, and the character ”H” corresponds to the
mode of non-level (climbing, descending or turning) ﬂight. For display pur-
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Table 5.1: Final probabilities for HHMM trained on data for climbing and
descending ﬂight after 10 iterations
Climbing p(· · · |C) p(· · · |H) p(· · · |START )
p(1 |· · · ) 0.00 0.44
p(2 |· · · ) 1.00 0.56
p(3 |· · · ) 0.00 0.00
p(C |· · · ) 0.90 0.05 1.00
p(H |· · · ) 0.05 0.95 0.00
p(STOP |· · · ) 0.05 0.00 0.00
Descending p(· · · |C) p(· · · |H) p(· · · |START )
p(1 |· · · ) 0.00 0.53
p(2 |· · · ) 0.84 0.47
p(3 |· · · ) 0.16 0.00
p(C |· · · ) 0.88 0.05 1.00
p(H |· · · ) 0.06 0.95 0.00
p(STOP |· · · ) 0.06 0.00 0.00
poses, the three classes of observations for predicted ﬂight over a 6 second
measurement interval are denoted by: Class 1, climbing/descending ﬂight,
Class 2, steady level ﬂight, and Class 3, turning ﬂight. The observation al-
phabet used is thus {1, 2, 3}. Note that in the full HMM the distinction is
made between climbing and descending ﬂight (as is done in Ref. 61), and
between a climbing turn and a descending turn, leading to an observation al-
phabet of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. This however is not conductive to concise graphical
or lexical display, and thus the above abstraction is used for visual reasons
and for notational simplicity. As can be seen from Table 5.1, the probabilities
for the mode transitions (i.e. P (C |H ) and P (H |C )) are almost identical
for both cases.
In Table 5.1, p(2 |C) (or p(2 |H) is the probability of being in steady level
ﬂight if the aircraft was in a level (or non-level) ﬂight mode at the previous
time instant. Hence,
p(1 |C) + p(2 |C) + p(3 |C) = p(1 |H) + p(2 |H) + p(3 |H) = 1 (5.2)
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Similarly P (H |C ) is the probability of being in a non-level ﬂight mode
if the aircraft was in a level mode at the previous time step.
P (STOP |· · · ) and p(· · · |START ) depend on the data set that the HHM
is being trained on. In the case of the climbing aircraft the probability of
being in a level ﬂight mode at the beginning of the data set, p(C |START ),
is one. For the descending aircraft the probability of reaching the end of the
data while being in a non-level ﬂight mode, p(STOP |H) , is zero. Hence,
p(C |C) + p(H |C) + p(STOP |C) = p(C |H) + p(H |H) + p(STOP |H) = 1
(5.3)
(a) Climbing flight (FL 260-290)
(b) Descending flight (FL 290-260)
Figure 5.4: Detection Threshold
Figure 5.4 illustrates the fact that the model’s ability to detect mode
transitions is very accurate, and usually occurs within two data cycles (within
approximately 12 seconds). The aircraft used for the climbing ﬂight proﬁle
was climbing parallel to its along-track axis, and the y values were almost
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Figure 5.5: Planar ﬂight path of the climbing aircraft
constant (shown in ﬁgure 5.5). As can be seen in ﬁgure 5.4(a) the probability
of being in level ﬂight drops below one before the aircraft starts to climb,
which could indicate a turn. But since the aircraft was ﬂying on a straight
line with zero degree change in its heading angle, the governing equations
for the stochastic hybrid evolution in this ﬂight mode was adjusted with the
following condition: if the change in the position of the aircraft along any of
its axes is less than 0.2 nmi, then the aircraft is either in steady level ﬂight,
or climbing/descending ﬂight, depending on the value of its altitude changes
during each time interval. Note, the model is not predicting the climbing
mode at this point. Thus, the addition of this pathological case created a
reﬁnement in the HMM, allowing it to become more robust in the learning
process. This allowed the HMM to make the clear determination of the
climbing ﬂight, thereby eliminating the turn mode, within approximately 12
seconds (between measurement intervals 10-12 on ﬁgure 5.4(a)). Thus, the
probability of P (3 |H) = P (3|C) = 0 for the HMM trained on the climbing
ﬂight data. The descending aircraft chosen was a clean descent without
signiﬁcant variation in the x-y plane and the model detected the mode change
from steady level ﬂight to descending ﬂight within the space of a measurement
interval (6 seconds in interval 11).
Measuring information entropy is one way to evaluate a model, and also
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a way to assess the complexity of a modeling task for a given repository of
data sets. Entropy is a measure of the level of certainty obtained with the
addition of one additional data point, or:
H =
∑
P (Observations)× lg2(P (Observations)). (5.4)
Mathematically, the perplexity of a model is deﬁned as the base two
exponent of the entropy. We generally say a model is good to the degree
that it assigns high probability (equivalently, low perplexity) to test data.
Obviously no modeling technique can guarantee that the model will assign
high probability to test data it has never seen, but the Baum-Welch algorithm
is guaranteed, at every iteration, to at least improve the probability of the
observed training data.
Figure 5.6 illustrates convergence via each iteration of the Baum-Welch
algorithm; the uncertainty associated with the transition probabilities is de-
creasing, and approaches a perplexity value of about two for the climbing
ﬂight (ﬁgure 5.6(a)) and a value of about 2.5 (ﬁgure 5.6(b)) for the descend-
ing ﬂight. Thus, the total probability assigned to of all the paths that explain
the data is always increasing. The plots in ﬁgure 5.6(c) and 5.6(d) show the
perplexity of data for the model that does not include turn mode [61].
For the climbing ﬂight example, the added condition in the stochastic hy-
brid evolution equations that uses the additional aircraft track information
provided by the heading angle (as well as the x-y positions) results in the
perplexity of the HMM with extended modes (level, climbing, descending,
level turn, climbing turn, descending turn) being equal to that of the sim-
ple model with three modes (level, climbing, descending). Thus, two extra
modes were added, but three extra pieces of observational information (per
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(a) Climbing flight (b) Descending flight
(c) Climbing flight for the previous model
[61]
(d) Descending flight for the previous
model [61]
Figure 5.6: Perplexity of data over 10 iterations
measurement) were provided in the training set. The heading angle allows
for the immediate elimination of the pathological turning case due to large
error in the x-y plane, thereby eliminating the need to consider any of the
turning modes of ﬂight when determining the mode in the extended model.
Hence, the values seen in ﬁgure 5.6(a) and ﬁgure 5.6(c) are equal, as the
extended model reduces to the simple model used in Ref. 61. However, in
the descending ﬂight, the initial perplexity and its ﬁnal value after 10 itera-
tions, are higher when the turn mode is added to the model. This is expected
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because the information provided by the heading angle is insuﬃcient to elim-
inate the uncertainty in determining whether the aircraft is in turning ﬂight
in the extended model.
(a) Mode detection threshold (b) Perplexity of data
Figure 5.7: Random Aircraft
Figure 5.8: Planar ﬂight path of the random aircraft
Now, to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of an HMM at detecting mode changes,
it is necessary to score the ability of the model to produce a given series of
observations. We can evaluate the performance of the trained HMM against
random aircraft trajectories in the speciﬁed ﬂight level, many of whom are
not well behaved.
A representative example of a random aircraft trajectory and the associ-
ated mode change sequence is given in Fig. 5.9. The perplexity of the data
over 10 iterations not only begins at a signiﬁcantly higher value (Fig. 5.9(b)),
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for the ﬁrst iteration (of 5.5, compared to 3.5 for the well behaved data), but
never settles below 3.5, demonstrating that even further reﬁnement may not
improve the entropy associated with the model. As can be seen, the perplex-
ity of the data in this extended model is higher than when the turn mode
is not included in the simpliﬁed model (Fig. 5.9(b)). Fig. 5.10 shows the
planar ﬂight path of this aircraft.
Fig. 5.7 shows another random aircraft. Turn mode detection is obvious
in this ﬁgure (ﬁgure 5.7(a)) and ﬁgure 5.8 indeed shows that the path of the
aircraft in x-y plane is a turn. Thus, within three measurement intervals,
the extended model is able to determine the mode switches between turning
ﬂight and descending turning ﬂight, then between descending turning ﬂight
and level ﬂight. The perplexity of the data over 10 iterations not only begins
at a signiﬁcantly higher value (ﬁgure 5.7(b)), for the ﬁrst iteration (of 5.5,
compared to 3.5 for the well behaved data), but never settles below 3.46,
demonstrating that even further reﬁnement may not improve the entropy
associated with the model.
5.3.2 Parameter Adjustment for Mode Detection
using FEWS Data
Now we use the HHMM to detect mode changes in a new set of aircraft ﬂight
data recorded for FAA’a Future Enroute Workstation Study (FEWS) using
the automaton shown in ﬁgure 4.1. Table 5.2 shows the ﬁnal probabilities
of the HHMM trained on a descending aircraft data. The three classes of
observations for predicted ﬂight over a twelve second interval are denoted by:
Class 1, descending ﬂight, Class 2, steady level ﬂight, and class 3, climbing
ﬂight. Figure 5.11 shows the mode change sequence and the perplexity of
59
(a) Mode detection threshold (b) Perplexity of data
(c) Mode detection threshold for the previous
model [61]
(d) Perplexity of data for the pre-
vious model [61]
Figure 5.9: Indeterminate ﬂight path
data for the descending aircraft.
Figure 5.13 shows a random aircraft. This aircraft is climbing from FL260
and at the 12th time instant, it levels oﬀ at FL290 and then starts descending
at the 33th time interval and levels oﬀ at the 47th time step when it reaches
FL220. Figure 5.14 shows the planar path of this aircraft. In ﬁgure 5.13 the
accuracy of the mode detection of the the HHMM described in this section is
compared with the accuracy of the HMM introduced in the previous section.
As can be seen the HHMM detects mode changes (e.g. climb to steady
level ﬂight) approximately 12 seconds before the HMM. Note that while the
initial perplexity of about 4.82 is higher than the 4.72 of the HMM model in
ﬁgure 5.13(d), the well behaved ﬂight modes evinced by the aircraft in ﬁgure
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Figure 5.10: Planar ﬂight path of the indeterminate aircraft
Table 5.2: Final probabilities for HHMM trained on FEWS data for descend-
ing ﬂight (FL 320-230) after 10 iterations
Descending p(· · · |C) p(· · · |H) p(· · · |START )
p(1 |· · · ) 0.00 1.00
p(2 |· · · ) 1.00 0.00
p(3 |· · · ) 0.00 0.00
p(C |· · · ) 0.97 0.06 0.00
p(H |· · · ) 0.00 0.94 1.00
p(STOP |· · · ) 0.03 0.00 0.00
5.13(b) have a ﬁnal complexity of about 2.67, lower than the 2.85 shown in
ﬁgure 5.13(d). Thus, the HHMM is more accurate in this case after suﬃcient
iteration.
It should be noted that the classical limitations of hidden Markov mod-
els are inherent in the HHMMs produced by this work. The fundamental
assumption in all Markov models is that the transition probabilities are in-
dependent, which may not necessarily be true of all ﬂight data. The HMM
is only as good as the data it was trained upon, and a tendency to iterate
too many times results in overﬁtting the data, thereby decreasing the score
of the model against other data sets.
Furthermore, we assume that our model has an inherent inertia, which
is characteristic of aircraft ﬂight paths. This acts to smooth the estimation
process over iterations. It should be noted, however, that the continuous
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(a) Mode detection threshold (b) Perplexity of data
Figure 5.11: Descending Flight
Figure 5.12: Planar ﬂight path of the descending aircraft
model used for the aircraft dynamics had associated with it, an uncertainty
equal to approximately 200 ft in the worst case, which is essentially equal
to the discrete estimation threshold used to determine the ﬂight observation
sequence.
Next, we compare the eﬃcacy of the HHMM with multiple-model Kalman
ﬁlter algorithms.
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(a) Mode detection threshold with HHMM (b) Perplexity of data for HHMM
(c) Mode detection threshold with HMM (d) Perplexity of data for HMM
Figure 5.13: Indeterminate ﬂight path
Figure 5.14: Planar ﬂight path of the indeterminate aircraft
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5.4 Comparing HMM and
State-Dependent-Transition Hybrid
Estimation Algorithm
Seah and Hwang [63] propose a stochastic linear system hybrid estimation
algorithm to improve tracking of aircraft around airports by using the knowl-
edge of departure or arrival aircraft ﬂight plans and nominal ﬂight proﬁles.
They use a multiple-model Kalman ﬁlter algorithm for aircraft tracking
with a new assumption, i.e., they consider mode transition probabilities to be
dependent on the continuous state, and they derive a conditional mode tran-
sition matrix. They present a discrete-time stochastic linear hybrid system
model of the aircraft dynamics:
x(k + 1) = Am(k)x(k) + Bm(k)wm(k)(k)
z(k) = Cm(k)x(k) + vm(k)(k) (5.5)
πij(x(k)) = P {m(k) = j |m(k − 1) = i, x(k)}
where the continuous state vector is x =
[
ξ ξ˙ ξ¨ η η˙ η¨ h h˙
]T
and m(k) ∈
{1, 2, · · · , r} is the discrete state/mode. Also the process noise and measure-
ment noise are uncorrelated zero-mean Gaussian sequences.
The horizontal ﬂight submodes are: CV (constant velocity and heading),
CA (constant acceleration/deceleration) and CT (coordinated turn with con-
stant speed and turning rate). The vertical submodes are: CH (constant
altitude) and CD (constant altitude change rate).
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First, they model the mode transitions using known/deterministic ﬂight
proﬁles (take-oﬀ, landing and movement along SID/STAR). They draw sep-
arate ﬁnite state automata for horizontal and vertical planes to show ﬂight
mode transition models for each ﬂight-mode change point (FCP), where the
transition conditions are called guard conditions (Cij). For the stochastic
model, they model the ﬂight proﬁles to be randomly distributed about the
nominal proﬁle with a Gaussian distribution uncertainty. They show that
the conditional mode transition probabilities πij can be expressed with mul-
tivariate Gaussian density functions instead of multivariate integrals. This
algorithm is called State-Dependent-Transition Hybrid Estimation (SDTHE)
algorithm.
Figures 5.15 and 5.16 compare the mode detection accuracy of HMM with
SDTHE and IMM algorithms under the conditions of Example 2 in Ref. 63.
Because of the discrete nature of the SDTHE and IMM algorithms, HMM
was used instead of the HHMM. As can be seen, HMM has a better accuracy
than IMM and it detects mode changes at the same time instant as SDTHE
algorithm.
The hidden Markov models extend to hybrid HMMs which, detect inputs
in an asynchronous fashion. On the other hand, Kalman ﬁlter techniques
(such as IMMs) are restricted in the sense that they have to wait for the next
discrete time interval to update their mode estimation. Hence, HHMMs are
able to detect changes that occur in an asynchronous fashion, that is, between
”update” intervals.
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Figure 5.15: Mode detection threshold HMM
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Figure 5.16: Mode detection threshold SDTHE, numbers 4 and 5 correspond
to submodes CH and CD respectively.
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Chapter 6
Decentralized Conﬂict
Detection and Resolution
Motion coordination/assignment is the general problem of reaching some
global spatial pattern of movement in a set of autonomous agents. In [64]
a notion of virtual nodes (VN) is developed where a virtual node is an ab-
stract, relatively well-behaved active node that is implemented using less
well-behaved real nodes. In this framework, virtual nodes are associated
with predetermined, well-distributed locations in the plane, communicating
among themselves and with mobile client nodes using local broadcast. The
plane is separated into disjoint zones, each belonging to a virtual node, which
is emulated by all the mobile nodes present in its zone. The VN abstraction
provides a centralized controller with reliable storage. The HIOA framework
is used to describe the components of the system. This VN abstraction layer
is applied to the problem of coordinating the motion of real mobile nodes in
a 2 dimensional space.
A distributed hybrid approach to the assignment problem in distributed
motion planning is considered in [65], which simultaneously addresses the
discrete assignment of destinations to agents, which is determined dynami-
cally through distributed coordination protocols, as well as the continuous
control strategies for driving the individual agents to the destinations.
The problem of safely coordinating the motion of several agents sharing
the same environment has received a great deal of attention. In the air
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traﬃc control literature, a control policy for generating provably safe conﬂict
resolution maneuvers for two aircraft is proposed in [66]. The approach
allows for uncertainty in the intent of one of the aircraft and calculates the
least restrictive control scheme for the other aircraft based on the worst case
uncertainty and the minimal unsafe operating region for each aircraft.
Other decentralized algorithms can be found in [67–70].
6.1 Verifying Safety Properties
Proving safety properties over cyber-physical systems involves generating the
set of reachable states for the system, and then assuring that a mathematical
invariant that embodies the safety property holds over this set. Generating
the exact reachable sets of hybrid systems is a non-trivial task, as most
ﬁxed point iteration schemes possess no guaranteed termination conditions,
rendering the problem intractable. Usually, fast overapproximations of the
reachable sets are generated instead, and the invariant property is proved
over the conservative set. However, the lack of a proof does not necessarily
mean that the exact reachable set does not obey the given property; it then
becomes necessary to ﬁnd a weaker formulation of the safety property, or a
closer overapproximation to the exact reachable set.
6.1.1 Automatic Invariance Veriﬁcation
Deﬁnition 6.1.1 Let M be a hybrid hidden Markov model with X as the
set of internal variables and set of states N = Q ⊂ val(X). Also let P be
a predicate on X. The set of states satisfying P is denoted by P as well.
The predicate P is called an invariant of M if RM ⊆ P, where RM is the
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reachable set of M.
An HHMM M is safe with respect to a particular safety property S, if S
is an invariant forM. If the set of reachable states ofM,RM, is computable,
then whether RM ⊆ S can be checked. Computing RM is decidable only
if M belongs to a fairly restricted class [71]. These decidable classes are
generally called order minimal hybrid automata [72] with linear, polynomial,
and exponential state models [69, 73–78].
If generating the exact reachable set is not trivial, another alternative
is to compute an overapproximation of RM, denoted by R¯M [79, 80] and
then check the invariant property over the conservative set. Algorithms for
overapproximation of reachable set for hybrid systems have been developed
[81–85].
We now introduce another class of properties of M.
Deﬁnition 6.1.2 Let M be a hybrid hidden Markov model with X as the
set of internal variables and set of states N = Q ⊂ val(X). A predicate P
on X is an inductive property of M if any execution that starts from a state
satisfying P reaches only states that also satisfy P. An inductive property P
that is satisﬁed by all the starting states of M is an invariant.
In computer science, invariants and levels of abstraction are standard
methods for reasoning about discrete systems. In Ref. 86 invariant assertion
is used to analyze an acceleration maneuver modeled by hybrid input/output
automata. A deductive technique used for verifying invariance has been
applied earlier to air traﬃc control systems in the context of HIOAs and
SHIOAs (structured HIOAs) [11,87] and also to vehicle control systems [86,
88, 89]. In this technique, the desired invariant property P is deduced from
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the speciﬁcations of the HHMM M by ﬁrst ﬁnding an inductive property
P ′ ⊆ P, and then checking that the transitions and trajectories ofM preserve
P ′ .
6.2 Case Study: Decentralized Policy for
Conﬂict Avoidance of Aircraft in a
Stream
6.2.1 Self Separation of Aircraft in a Stream
If we deﬁne collision between any two (or more) aircraft PNi and PNj as
being such that a loss of physical separation occurs (say, as being the two
aircraft are no longer laterally separated by 5 nautical miles, or no longer
vertically separated by 1000ft), then we can express the act of collision in
terms of the reachable sets of the automata (HHMMs) PNi and PNj.
For each aircraft PNi in a bounded sector B in 3, all of whom possess
unique identiﬁers i ∈ I, communication occurs via Automatic Dependent
Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) technique. That is, all aircraft PNj within
a radius Rp of the agent PNi who sends broadcast message m at time t, will
receive the message m in the bounded time interval [t, t + δPNi], provided
that PNj remains within Rp for the entire interval.
Deﬁnition 6.2.1 Denote the set of states reachable for an HHMM PN in
the time interval [t, t + δPN ] = Δt as being RPN : xPN −→ 2xPN ; where xPN
is the position of PN at time t, and RPN(xPN) is the set of all physically at-
tainable points for the aircraft PN in the time interval Δt, given its dynamic
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constraints.
Note that this deﬁnition can be extended to encompass a set relation.
That is, given a set of possible initial positions, Θ, (and a probabilistic dis-
tribution over these positions); we denote the set of reachable states (and
its corresponding probabilistic distribution) as being the union of reachable
sets derived using each point in the initial set as the starting point in the
singleton relation.
Deﬁnition 6.2.2 The set of reachable states for PN in [t, t + δPN ], given
the initial set of start states Θ, is denoted by RPN(Θ) =
⋃
xPN∈Θ RPN(xPN).
This leads to the formal deﬁnition of a collision as:
Deﬁnition 6.2.3 A collision between aircraft PNi and PNj is formally de-
ﬁned as occurring if
CPNi,j :
{
xPNi − xPNj
} ≤ K (6.1)
where K is the collision threshold. We denote this as (xPNi , xPNj) ∈ CPNi,j .
The threshold K is a vector quantity as the threshold for lateral separa-
tion diﬀers from that of vertical separation.
For aircraft traveling along a parameterized route lateral separation is
the primary concern. If we bound the maximum and minimum acceleration
[a, a] and velocity [v, v] each aircraft is capable of maintaining, we arrive at
the following two conditions necessary to ensure self separation along the
parameterized path for the time interval Δt.
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Theorem 6.2.4 If we consider the scenario where three aircraft PNi, PNj
and PNk correspond to the leading aircraft, the ”own” aircraft and the lag-
ging aircraft, respectively and with the assumption of starting from a safe
condition, we must have, for safety and liveness to be guaranteed in the time
interval Δt = [t0, t0 + δt]:
∃vj > v, a(τ) ∈ [a, a] such that
K + xPNj (t0) +
∫ t0+δt
t0
(vj(t0) + a(τ)tau)dτ ≤ xPNi(t0) (6.2)
+
∫ t0+δt
t0
(vPNi(t0) + aτ)dτ
and
xPNj(t0) +
∫ t0+δt
t0
(vPNj(t0) + a(τ)dτ)dτ ≥ K + xPNk(t0) (6.3)
+
∫ t0+δt
t0
(vPNk(t0) + a¯τ)dτ
This is a conservative bound, which assumes nothing about the behavior
of PNi and PNk, only that PNj has received the broadcast message mi
containing xi and mk containing xk.
6.2.2 Problem Deﬁnition
Here we consider a decentralized air traﬃc control system, where aircraft
are ﬂying along diﬀerentiable curves (i.e., enroute ﬂight paths) that we call
streams. The streams are placed in such a way that all the streams on
the vertical plane and all the streams on the lateral plane are conﬂict free.
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Hence we can look at one of these streams on which the aircraft are ordered
1 < 2 < · · · < i − 1 < i < i + 1 < · · ·N , where the 1st aircraft is in the
lead, and the N th aircraft is trailing. Safety conditions prohibit two air-
craft loosing a separation of L ( K = (L,D)), and liveness conditions require
each aircraft to maintain a minimum velocity v. Performance considerations
limit maximum acceleration and maximum deceleration, a ∈ [a¯, a], as well as
maximum velocity v¯. Thus the initial conditions for one stream are:
vi ∈ [v, v¯] ∀i ∈ [1, · · · , N ] (6.4)
|xi+1 − xi| > L |xi − xi−1| > L ∀i ∈ [2, · · · , N − 1] (6.5)
The communication radius for all aircraft is assumed to be R, where
R >> L.
The composite HHMM for each of these aircraft, H , is composed of four
component HHMMs, where each corresponds to a mode of ﬂight and are
labeled Cruise, Accelerate, Climb and Turn, as shown in Fig. 6.1. In this
model the Cruise Automaton acts as a Markovian scheduler/supervisor. It
receives the global inputs, i.e., the ﬂight data of the neighboring aircraft,
along with the local inputs corresponding to the ”own” aircraft. If no poten-
tial conﬂicts are detected, it only evolves the steady level ﬂight trajectories
and sends out the ﬂight data of the ”own” aircraft. But if a conﬂict is de-
tected, it determines the resolution maneuver, and then sends out the new
ﬂight data to both the next mode automaton and the neighboring aircraft
automata. Now we will develop each automaton in HIOA language. But ﬁrst
we will present the language speciﬁcations.
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Figure 6.1: Composed HHMM for each aircraft
6.2.3 The HIOA Language
We use the HIOA language described in Ref. 11 to describe the component
HHMM.
The ﬁrst line consists of the keyword automaton followed by the au-
tomaton’s name and a list of formal parameters, which are used to specify
sets of objects such as automata, actions, trajectories, etc.
The body of the speciﬁcation has four sections: signature, variables, tran-
sitions, and trajectories. The actions of an automaton are declared by the
keyword signature followed by a list of actions and their kinds.
The variables section declares the variables of the automaton along with
their kinds, types, dynamic types and possibly their initial value.
The discrete transitions corresponding to each action of the automaton
are deﬁned in the transitions section. A precondition can be deﬁned using
the keyword pre followed by a predicate on the automaton parameters, action
parameters and the internal variables. Due to the input enabling condition,
preconditions cannot be deﬁned for input actions. The program following
the keyword eﬀ deﬁnes how the state changes when the action occurs. The
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statements of the program are assignments, or conditionals or loops.
The trajectories section deﬁnes a set of state models for the automa-
ton. Each trajectory deﬁnition starts with the keyword trajdef followed by
a name for the state model, an optional invariant condition, a stopping con-
dition using the keyword stop when and a set of Diﬀerential and Algebraic
Inequalities (DAIs).
Figure 6.2 shows the Cruise Automaton (HHMM) in HIOA language [11]
for Hi. Hi has two sets of global input and output actions corresponding to
communication from Hi−1 and Hi+1. Cruise receives the global inputs and
the local inputs corresponding to Hi. The receive action receives the aircraft
current ﬂight data, i.e., the position, velocity and heading of each aircraft
and evolves the steady level ﬂight trajectories. Then, to detect potential
conﬂicts the safety condition is checked by the internal action, conﬂictdetect.
If a conﬂict is detected, the value of the boolean internal variable conﬂict
changes to true and the evolution of the trajectories stops. To resolve the
conﬂict the resolve action follows the conﬂict action, where a Markovian
scheduler determines the resolving maneuver. The protocol is as follows.
The ﬁrst choice is the acceleration mode, but if acceleration or deceleration
cannot be done due to the occurrence of further violations, the climb mode
should be considered, however if another aircraft is above or below Hi, then
the turn mode is chosen. When the acceleration mode is chosen, a new value
for velocity is determined, similarly for the climb mode, a new altitude and
for the turn mode a new heading is determined. The send output action
sends the new values of ﬂight data both to the subsequent automaton as well
as to Hi−1 and Hi+1 along with the new intended value of altitude, velocity
or heading. The automata corresponding to the climb/descend, turn and
acceleration maneuvers are shown in Figures 6.3,6.4,6.5 respectively.
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Automaton Climb/Descend
Signature
Input
receive(m),m ∈(position,velocity,heading,newaltitude)
Ouput
send(m),m ∈(position,velocity,heading)
Variables
Internal
(xcd, ycd, zcd) ∈ 3;vcd ∈ ;φcd ∈ ;
(αcd, znewcd) ∈ 2
Transitions
Input receive(position,velocity,heading,newaltitude)
eﬀect
(xcd, ycd, zcd) ← position
vcd ← velocity
φcd ← heading
(αcd, znewcd) ← newaltitude
output send(position,velocity,heading)
pre
zcd = znewcd
Trajectories
trajdef ﬂightdata
evolve
x˙cd = vcd cos(φcd) cos(αcd)
y˙cd = vcd sin(φcd) cos(αcd)
z˙cd = vcd sin(αcd)
stop when
zcd = znewcd
Figure 6.3: Climb Automaton
6.2.4 The Conﬂict Avoidance Policy
In this setup without loss of generality, we assume for each pair of aircraft the
leading aircraft is in charge of conﬂict avoidance, i.e., it ﬁrst detects the con-
ﬂict using the mode identiﬁcation property of HHMM and then performs the
resolution manuever. There are four available maneuvers which we describe
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Automaton Turn
Signature
Input
receive(m),m ∈(position,velocity,heading,newheading)
Ouput
send(m),m ∈(position,velocity,heading)
Variables
Internal
(xt, yt, zt) ∈ 3;(xt0, yt0, zt0) ∈ 3;vt ∈ ;
φt ∈ ;rnewt ∈ 
Transitions
Input receive(position,velocity,heading,newheading)
eﬀect
(xt, yt, zt)← position
(xt0, yt0, zt0)← position
vt ← velocity
φt ← heading
rnewt ← newheading
output send(position,velocity,heading)
pre
(x2t + y
2
t ) = (x
2
t0 + y
2
t0)
(1/2) + 2rnewt
Trajectories
trajdef ﬂightdata
evolve
x˙t = vt cos(φt)
y˙t = vt sin(φt)
z˙t = 0
φ˙t = φ˙t
stop when
(x2t + y
2
t ) = (x
2
t0 + y
2
t0)
(1/2) + 2rnewt
Figure 6.4: Turn Automaton
in detail in the following sections.
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Automaton Acceleration
Signature
Input
receive(m),m ∈(position,velocity,heading,newheading)
Ouput
send(m),m ∈(position,velocity,heading)
Variables
Internal
(xa, ya, za) ∈ 3;va ∈ ;φa ∈ ;
va0 ∈ ;(anewa, vnewa) ∈ 2
Transitions
Input receive(position,velocity,heading,newvelocity)
eﬀect
(xa, ya, za)← position
va0 ← velocity
va ← velocity
φa ← heading
(anewa, vnewa) ← newvelocity
output send(position,velocity,heading)
pre
va = vnewa
Trajectories
trajdef ﬂightdata
evolve
x˙t = (va0 + anewtt) cos(φt)
y˙t = (va0 + anewtt) sin(φt)
z˙t = 0
stop when
va = vnewa
Figure 6.5: Acceleration Automaton
The Cruise Maneuver
As long as each pair of aircraft are not in conﬂict the leading aircraft does
not change its speed, heading or pitch.
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vti = v
t−1
i ifvi > vi+1 (6.6)
The Acceleration Maneuver
If a conﬂict is detected, the ﬁrst available resolution maneuver for the leading
aircraft is acceleration.
For the acceleration maneuver to be feasible, there are three conditions
that should be met:
vi < vi+1
vi < vi+1, (
1
2
aτ 2 + viτ)− (vτ) ≥ L′ (6.7)
vf < v¯ (6.8)
where, L
′
> L is the initial distance between the two aircraft and vf is the
ﬁnal speed of the leading aircraft at the end of the maneuver.
If these conditions are met, then the transition function for acceleration
is
vti = v
t−1
i + a(τ − ) ≥ vt+1i+1 (6.9)
where  is the maximum acceleration time.
The Climb Maneuver
When the leading aircraft performs the climb maneuver, it increases its speed
with maximum acceleration to maximum speed, then starts climbing with the
possible maximum pitch to a secondary stream which is D distance above the
main stream and then decreases its speed to the minimum speed. This means
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that all the aircraft on the secondary stream are ﬂying with minimum speed.
Hence, no conﬂict occurs on the secondary stream except for when the aircraft
wants to insert itself into the stream (i.e., when it climbs to the secondary
stream and reaches the minimum speed). Thus the turn maneuver is only
chosen when the aircraft can insert itself into the stream. The conditions for
a safe climb maneuver are as the following
xi−1 + vi−1T +
1
2
a(T − )2 ≤ xi + at
3
6
+ v cos(α)(T − t) (6.10)
v sin(α)(T − t) ≥ D (6.11)
where T is the maneuver time, t2 = v−via

and da
dt
≤ a

.
xk−1 + v[T + τ ]− (xi + at
3
6
+ v cos(α)(T − t) + vτ) > L (6.12)
where τ = 2(v−v)a

.
The Turn Maneuver
The turn maneuver is always enabled if the distance between each pair of
aircraft is enforced to be at least L
′
> L. L
′
is selected using
∫ Turn
0
v sin(ψ)dt > L
′
(6.13)
where Turn = f(ψ˙, rturn).
Destination Merge
Since the climb and turn maneuvers result in secondary streams of aircraft,
we need a policy for merging the aircraft at the destination (e.g., an airport).
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There are two possible policies. The ﬁrst one, which we call merge at the
destination, dictates that the aircraft on the secondary streams should wait
for all the aircraft on the main stream to merge. According to the second
policy, called the priority merge, if the aircraft in the lead has neighbors on
both the above and side streams, it should let two aircraft from diﬀerent
streams merge ahead of it. And if the aircraft in the lead has neighbors from
one stream, it should let one aircraft from that stream merge ahead of it.
6.2.5 Proof of Safety
Theorem 6.2.5 N aircraft are moving along a diﬀerentiable curve (an en-
route ﬂight path). The aircraft can be strictly ordered 1 < 2 < · · · < i− 1 <
i < i + 1 < · · ·N , where the 1st aircraft is in the lead, and the N th aircraft
is trailing. If the system starts in a safe state, i.e., the aircraft have enough
separation at initial time, then it will always remain in a safe state using the
composed HHMM and the Markovian scheduler which uses the decentralized
common policy.
Proof The proof of the theorem follows from the fact that trajectories are
continuous functions of time. If at any point a pair of aircraft are in conﬂict
the Markovian scheduler of the leading aircraft chooses a resolution maneu-
ver. If this maneuver is acceleration, then the leading aircraft will change its
speed until the two aircraft are not in conﬂict anymore and resumes steady
level ﬂight (cruise). If the resolution maneuver is climb (because the ac-
celeration maneuver does not resolve the conﬂict), then the aircraft starts
climbing to the new altitude and resumes the cruise maneuver. However, if
the turn mode is chosen, then the aircraft transition to turn mode and when
it reaches the desired curve, it goes back to the original cruise mode. Hence,
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any conﬂict between pairs of aircraft is resolved within two transitions. Since
this is a common policy between any two pair of aircraft, safety is always
assured. Furthermore, we assume that all aircraft have enough fuel so that
during the merge process even for the worst case scenario, which is the case
where the ﬁrst aircraft becomes the last aircraft to merge, they all eventually
merge.
6.3 Conﬂict Detection Extension to Higher
Dimensions
The decentralized conﬂict avoidance algorithm that we introduce here is
based on the generalized roundabout policy (GR) of [90], in which the prob-
lem of collision-free motion planning for a number of nonholonomic mobile
agents evolving on the plane is considered. The agents are able to move on
the plane at constant speed, along paths with bounded curvature and the
environment in which the agents move is unbounded and free of obstacles.
The agents are aware of the position and orientation of nearby agents, within
a certain sensing or communication radius, but they do not have access to
any other information and they are not required to communicate explicitly
their intentions or their objectives. However, all agents make decisions based
on a common set of a priori decided rules. The GR policy provides provably
safe sensor-based motion planning for an arbitrary number of agents.
The mathematical deﬁnition of the decentralized conﬂict detection algo-
rithm for an aircraft, represented by an HIOA, which then receives as inputs
the position, velocity and heading of all aircraft within sensor range, allows
for the aircraft in question to run HHMMs of each aircraft, and to proba-
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bilistically predict what mode of the HIOA each sensed aircraft has engaged.
This allows for proactive conﬂict detection and resolution maneuvers that can
be enacted by each aircraft, without involving overt communication between
aircraft.
Aircraft are regarded as possessing a 5 nmi radius of lateral space to
deﬁne its lateral conﬂict zone, and a 1000 ft vertical height to deﬁne its
vertical conﬂict zone. This means that each ith aircraft can be regarded as
being centered in a cylindrical buﬀer, denoted by Cbufferi which has a ds = 5
nmi lateral radius, and a height of vs = 2000 ft. If the cylindrical buﬀers of
any two (or more) aircraft overlap, they are said to be in conﬂict. Thus, if
we deﬁne the ith aircraft holding position (xi(t), yi(t), zi(t)) at time t, then
the cylindrical buﬀer zone about the ith aircraft is deﬁned as:
Cbufferi =
{
(x, y, z)|(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 ≤ (5 ∗ 6080.20)2 ∧ |z − zi| ≤ 1000
}
(6.14)
where (x,y,z) are speciﬁed in feet, with the origin given by standard hemi-
spherical longitude and latitude.
Let us consider creating a more conservative buﬀering zone: deﬁne the
maximum acceleration and maximum velocity that the aircraft can attain
in the lateral and vertical planes as {aLmax, aV max} and {vLmax, vV max} re-
spectively through performance speciﬁcations, and the maximum pitching
and turning angles that the aircraft can execute as {αmax, ψmax}. Then, we
can embed the cylindrical buﬀer in a more conservative cylinder, deﬁned by
the maximum vertical distance, dV max and lateral distance dLmax that the
aircraft can travel from its present position in the next 12 second update
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interval, centered at the position of the ith aircraft as follows:
Cconi =
{
(x, y, z)|(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 ≤ (dLmax)2 ∧ |z − zi| ≤ dV max
}
(6.15)
A suﬃcient condition to ensure safety is that the interiors of conservative
buﬀers Cconi are disjoint at all times; if such a condition is met, conﬂicts can
be avoided if agents hold their conservative buﬀers ﬁxed, and move within
them (by setting ψ′ = −1, which results in circular motion about a ﬁxed
center, for normalized and rate limited ψ′). As a consequence, each point of
contact between conservative buﬀers deﬁnes a constraint on further motion
for both agents involved. More precisely, if the conservative buﬀer of agent i
is in contact with the conservative buﬀers of agents with indices in Ji, where
i ⊂ {1, ..., n} of the n aircraft, the motion of the agents is constrained as
follows:
x′i(xj − xi) + y′i(yj − yi) ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ Ji (6.16)
In other words, the velocity of the ith conservative buﬀer is constrained
to remain in the convex cone determined by the intersection of a number
of closed half-planes. Note that the full set of constraints can be computed
assuming that each agent is aware of the conﬁguration of all agents within the
sum of conservative buﬀers. In addition, the amount of information needed
to compute the bound is uniformly bounded, independent from the total
number of agents in the system: in fact, the maximum number of agents
whose conservative buﬀer is in contact with the conservative buﬀer of the
computing agent is twenty.
As previously mentioned, setting ψ′ = −1 causes an immediate stop of
an aircraft’s conservative buﬀer’s motion. We will say that when ψ′ = −1,
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the aircraft is in the Hold state. Given that each aircraft is assigned origin-
destination pairs, (gi0, gif) = [(xi0, yi0, zi0), (xif , yif , zif)], the Straight mode
is deﬁned as being, at time t:
ψi(t) = arctan(
yif − yi(t)
xif − xi(t)) ∧ ψ′ = 0 ∧ vL = 0 ∧ vV = 0 (6.17)
that is, the heading angle is the planar line of sight angle (discounting
pitch) to the destination from the present position, and the aircraft is moving
laterally along that heading angle at a non-zero velocity, while not changing
altitude.
Deﬁne the set-valued map Θ : SE(2)× 2SE(2) → 2S1 , associating to the
conﬁgurations of an aircraft and of its neighbors the set of allowable lateral di-
rections in which the conservative buﬀer of the computing aircraft can trans-
late without violating the constraints of 6.16. For a connected, non-empty set
B ⊂ S1, B /∈ ∅; deﬁne max(B) and min(B) as the elements on the bound-
ary of B, respectively in the positive and negative direction with respect to
the bisectrix of B. Finally, deﬁne the map Θ−(g, g¯) = Θ(g, g¯)\min(Θ(g, g¯)).
In other words, the output of Θ− is an open set, obtained removing the
boundary in the clockwise direction of the cone of feasible reserved region
translations, where gi = (xi, yi, ψi) is the lateral position of the i
th aircraft.
Whenever Θ is a proper subset of S1, max(Θ), min(Θ), and Θ− are well
deﬁned. If Θ = ∅, or Θ = S1, we set Θ− = Θ.
Our concept for decentralized conﬂict-free coordination is based on main-
taining the interiors of conservative buﬀers’ disjoint. Assuming that no con-
straints are violated, an aircraft will attempt to steer the center of its own
conservative buﬀer towards the position it would assume at the target conﬁg-
uration. In a free environment, this can be accomplished switching between
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the Hold state and the Straight state according to the following logic:
ψ′(t) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0, ψ = arctan(
yif−yi
xif−xi ) ∧ gi = gf if conservative conﬂict
−1 otherwise
(6.18)
where a conservative conﬂict is deﬁned as at least one other aircraft having
their conservative buﬀer in tangential contact with the ith aircraft’s buﬀer,
and (xi0, yi0, zi0), (xif , yif , zif) are the coordinates of the origin and destina-
tion for the ith aircraft.
Note that conservative buﬀers move along straight lines according to 6.18;
clearly, such a policy is not optimal (in a minimum-time or minimum-length
sense), but it does provide a simple feasible path for the agent from the
current conﬁguration to its target.
If the path of the conservative buﬀer to its position at the target is blocked
by another conservative buﬀer, a possible course of action is represented by
ascending or descending above or below the blocking conservative buﬀers.
Since in our setup agents communicate only information on their states, not
on their future intentions, care must be exercised in such a way that the
interiors of conservative buﬀers remain disjoint. We use the probabilistic
mode information gleaned from the HHMMs correspondent to each aircraft
Ji in order to do so.
Let us start by assuming that the conservative buﬀer of the neighboring
aircraft remains stationary and is planar with the ith aircraft; in order to
bypass such a conservative buﬀer, without violating safety constraints, the
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control input must be set to
αi = arctan(
dV max
2dLmax
) (6.19)
v′ = 2
122
∗ [d2Lmax + (
dV max
2
)− vi ∗ (12)] (6.20)
The above policy is obtained by switching between the hold state and a
climb/descend state; note that when in the climb/descend state, the agent
is not climbing or descending at the maximum rate.
Note that 6.19 and 6.20 also addresses the case in which the aircrafts
motion is constrained by more than one contact with other aircrafts conser-
vative buﬀers. The only case in which the aircraft will not transition to the
climb/descend state, is the degenerate case.
In general, the conservative buﬀer of an aircraft will not necessarily re-
main stationary while an aircraft is climbing/descending over it. Further-
more, the aircraft in contact with the conservative buﬀer may not be copla-
nar. While it can be recognized that the interiors of the conservative buﬀers
of two or more coplanar aircraft executing 6.19 and 6.20 will always remain
disjoint, it is possible that contact between two aircraft is lost unexpectedly
(recall that the control input of other aircraft, their constraints, and their
targets, are not available) or that the aircraft are non-coplanar. In this case,
we introduce a new state, which we call Turn, in which the aircraft utilizes
the probabilistic mode information given by the HHMM for the Ji aircraft
in contact with the conservative buﬀer of the ith aircraft to predict whether
a climb/descend maneuver is possible following a lateral maneuver. In this
case, the aircraft then implements a lateral turn motion (or possibly hold, if
the conﬁguration of all 20 contiguous conservative buﬀer aircraft are present),
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based on the assumed mode of the Ji aircraft in conservative buﬀer contact.
Thus, while in climb/descend mode, either climbing or descending immedi-
ately becomes a viable option given the nature of the surrounding coplanar
stationary Ji aircraft and the absence of non-coplanar aircraft; the prefer-
ential mode of Turn is chosen if suﬃcient mode information is available, as
follows:
α(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
+arctan( dV max
2dLmax
) if
∑
Ji
(zJi − zi) ≤ 0 ∧ card(Ji) < 20
−arctan( dV max
2dLmax
) if
∑
Ji
(zJi − zi) ≥ 0 ∧ card(Ji) < 20
0 otherwise
(6.21)
where card is the cardinality operator.
We then deﬁne the heading ψ at which we wish to turn to , and then
either execute a climb/descend maneuver (or possibly continue in straight
line ﬂight) as long as the heading ψ is at least ±60◦ away from all ψJi deﬁned
by the vectors (or bisectricies):
ψJi = arctan(
yJi − yi
xJi − xi
), ∀Ji (6.22)
The Turn state can only be entered if the previous state was Hold or Straight
and the current heading was incorrect in order to perform a Climb/Descend
maneuver. This is due to the fact that it is preferential to climb or descend
to avoid a conﬂict, rather than maneuver laterally. The aircraft is essen-
tially ”rolling” its conservative buﬀer around the surface of the obstructing
conservative buﬀer, until it can realign its lateral heading direction to an
unobstructed path and perform a climb/descend maneuver (or recover an
unobstructed lateral path to its destination). It turns at the prescribed rate:
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ψ′(t) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1
1+
dLmax
2
Θ−(g, g¯) /∈ ∅ ∧ ψ = max(Θ) if conservative conﬂict
−1 otherwise
(6.23)
The above policy is obtained by switching between the Hold state and
the Turn state; note that when in the Turn state, the aircraft is not turning
at the maximum rate. Note this also addresses the case in which the air-
crafts motion is constrained by more than one contact with other aircrafts
conservative buﬀer. The only case in which the aircraft will not transition
to the Turn state, is the degenerate case, where Θ is singleton, and Θ− is
empty, that is, the aircraft’s conservative buﬀer is surrounded laterally by
six aircrafts’ conservative buﬀers.
The HIOA for this extended conﬂict detection algorithm is detailed below.
automaton ExtendedConflictAvoidance
(HHMModeJi, (x, y, z)Ji, Ji ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n})
signature
output Out(Conflictm:bools, m : Ji)
internal straight
internal turn
internal climb/descend
internal hold
variables
[x, y, z, ψ, α]: array[reals] := 0
now:reals := 0
HHMMode(m): [bools] := [acceleration, climb, cruise, turn], ∀m ∈ Ji
Q:[bools] := {straight, climb/descend, hold, turn}
ConflictJi: [bools] := 0, ∀Ji
Θ−: [reals] := [0, 2π)
transitions
internal straight
pre (Q = ’Straight’) ∨ (Q = ’Hold’ ∧ψ ∈ Θ−)
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pre (xi, yi, zi) = (xif , yif , zif )
pre ¬∃ConflictJi | HHMMode(m)= ’Turn’ ∨ ’Climb’, m ∈ Ji
eﬀ
ψ = arctan(
yif−yi
xif−xi )
dψ = 0
α = 0
dα = 0
post ∀Ji compute Θ−, ConflictJi
internal turn
pre (Q = ’Turn’) ∨ (Q = ’Hold’)
pre (xi, yi, zi) = (xif , yif , zif )
pre ¬∃ConflictJi | HHMMode(m) =’Climb’ ∨ ’Accelerate’, m ∈ Ji
eﬀ
dψ = 1
1+ ds
2
∧ Θ−(g, g¯) /∈ ∅ ∧ ψ = max(Θ)
α = 0
dα = 0
post ∀Ji compute Θ−, ConflictJi
post ψ ∈ Θ−
internal climb/descend
pre (Q = ’Turn’) ∨ (Q = ’Hold’)
pre (xi, yi, zi) = (xif , yif , zif )
pre ψ ∈ Θ−)
pre ¬∃ConflictJi | HHMMode(m) =’Climb’, m ∈ Ji
eﬀ
dψ = 0
α =
{
+arctan( dV max
2dLmax
) if
∑
Ji
(zJi − zi) ≤ 0 ∧ card(Ji) < 20
−arctan( dV max
2dLmax
) if
∑
Ji
(zJi − zi) ≥ 0 ∧ card(Ji) < 20
dα = 0
post ∀Ji compute Θ−, ConflictJi
post ψ ∈ Θ−)
internal hold
pre Θ− ∈ ∅)
pre ∃ConflictJi|HHMMode(m) = ’Climb’ ∨ ’Accelerate’ ∨ ’Turn’
pre m ∈ Ji
pre (xi, yi, zi) = (xif , yif , zif )
eﬀ
dψ = -1
α = 0
dα = 0
post ∀Ji compute Θ−, ConflictJi
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trajectories
trajdef ﬂightdata
evolve
d(now) = 1
dxi = cos(ψi)cos(αi)
dyi = sin(ψi)cos(αi)
dzi = cos(αi)
dψ = dψq, q ∈ Q
dα = dαq, q ∈ Q
6.3.1 Conﬂict Detection Extension: Safety Theorem
Theorem 6.3.1 For all initial conditions for which the interiors of the air-
crafts’ conservative buﬀers are disjoint, i.e.,
n⋂
j=1
[Cconi = (x, y, z)|(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 ≤ (dLmax)2 ∧ |z − zi| ≤ dV max]
(6.24)
the Extended Conﬂict Detection algorithm is safe, that is,
∀t ≥ 0, (xj −xi)2 +(yj − yi)2 ≤ (5 ∗ 6080.20)2∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i = j (6.25)
and
∀t ≥ 0, |zj − zi| ≤ 1000, ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i = j (6.26)
Proof The proof of the theorem follows directly from the fact that trajec-
tories gi(t), i = 1, . . . , n are continuous functions of time. Moreover, within
each state the feedback control policy has been chosen so that conservative
buﬀer zones that are not overlapping can never come into an overlapping
state without triggering the ’Hold’ mode. The transition is always enabled
to the ’Hold’ state, which stops the overall motion of the conservative buﬀer
instantaneously, even though the aircraft and the conﬂict buﬀer is still in mo-
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tion inside the conservative buﬀer. Since the aircraft are always contained
within their conservative buﬀers, at a lateral distance ds/2 and a vertical
distance vs/2 from its boundary, safety is ensured.
93
Chapter 7
Conclusions
The objective of this work was to develop a framework which can be used
in analysis of stochastic hybrid systems with hidden states and uncertain-
ties. Speciﬁcally the intent was to develop speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation for
a framework that interacts with air traﬃc control system to perform con-
ﬂict detection and resolution.Therefore, the Hybrid Hidden Markov Models,
HHMM, framework, incorporating both continuous states and unknown dis-
crete state transition probabilities was developed. HHMMs map the proba-
bilistic timed I/O automata, PTIOA, framework into hidden Markov models.
Using HHMMs allows us to look at the aircraft mode identiﬁcation prob-
lem as a hybrid system with continuous variables (trajectories) instead of
a discrete system. This model is most representative of the actual physi-
cal evolution of an aircraft in ﬂight, as it behaves in a continuous manner.
When the aircraft trajectories are modeled as continuous, we have an inﬁnite
number of states; in order to study them we must use a ﬁnite abstraction of
the states, which is enabled by the notion of levels of abstraction (or equiv-
alence classes) in the HIOA framework. That is why we can use abstract
ﬂight modes, such as steady level ﬂight or accelerating turn, to represent the
physical dynamics of the aircraft.
Modeling the aircraft dynamics as continuous coupled diﬀerential equa-
tions allows us to detect mode changes in a more timely fashion. That is, we
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do not have to wait for the next discrete time interval to update our estimate
of the mode of the system. As inputs arrive asynchronously to the HIOA,
the boundary between two modes of ﬂight requires that the ﬁnal valuations
of all continuous variables in the prior mode become the initial values in the
subsequent mode (unless they are overwritten by the triggering input). An
HHMM can be used in conjunction with actual ﬂight data from a TRACON,
in order to model the conformance of aircraft to ﬂight paths, or to detect
when individual aircraft change their mode of ﬂight (e.g. when an aircraft
changes its ﬂight path from steady level ﬂight, to climbing ﬂight etc.).
In order to eﬀectively perform conﬂict detection and conformance mon-
itoring, there is a potential to use stochastic hybrid models to detect mode
transitions, and thereby aid in the planning of future trajectories and resolu-
tion maneuvers. The ability to eﬃciently detect mode changes using Hybrid
Hidden Markov Models is demonstrated by evaluating the prediction prob-
abilities of various trained and composite HHMMs, each of which possesses
a diﬀering level of abstraction, along with varying mode structures and de-
grees of complexity. The inherent inertia of an HHMM is suﬃciently less
than that of its equivalent HMM (which is essentially a predictive altitude
threshold model). That is, the HHMM is better able to model, then distin-
guish, between changes attributed to noise and/or disturbances, as opposed
to actual changes in commanded ﬂight paths. This is because the HHMM
formalism allows for the incorporation of continuous, stochastic elements,
such as random walks (wind disturbances) and Gaussian noise.
We have used two diﬀerent sets of real ﬂight data, NDMS data and FEWS
data, in the evaluation of the HHMM framework. The dynamic model inher-
ent in the HHMM’s probabilistic determination of ﬂight mode using actual
ﬂight data yields results that are more accurate than the purely discrete
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HMM. The HHMM detected the mode change from climbing to level ﬂight
approximately 12 seconds before the HMM. In this case the overall perplexity
of the HHMM was 2.67 which is better than the HMM’s value of 2.85. These
comparisons used actual NDMS and FEWS ﬂight data.
HHMM is capable of distinguishing between multiple modes (climb, turn,
etc.) in an asynchronous fashion. When presented with random aircraft ﬂight
data, HHMM is able to detect mode changes in approximately two time steps
after they are initiated. We have favorably benchmarked the model against
the results achieved in Ref. 63, demonstrating the validity of the model and
the HMM technique.
Also, to extend the work into decentralized CD&R (that is, the notion
that each aircraft has an HHMM onboard and gets information from its
neighboring aircraft), we need these models to be composable, a property
that is guaranteed by using the HIOA framework. The receptiveness property
of the HIOA does not allow the state machine to block time or to contribute
to producing Zeno behavior (inﬁnite number of discrete transitions in a ﬁnite
time).
We studied two decentralized air traﬃc systems. In the ﬁrst system,
N aircraft are moving along a diﬀerentiable curve (an enroute ﬂight path).
Safety conditions prohibit two aircraft loosing a separation of K, and liveness
conditions require each aircraft to maintain a minimum velocity. The com-
posite HHMM for each of these aircraft, H , is composed of four component
HHMMs, where each corresponds to a mode of ﬂight and are labeled Cruise,
Accelerate, Climb and Turn. In this model the Cruise Automaton acts as a
Markovian scheduler. It receives the global inputs, i.e., the ﬂight data of the
neighboring aircraft, along with the local inputs corresponding to the ”own”
aircraft. If no potential conﬂicts are detected, it only evolves the steady level
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ﬂight trajectories and sends out the ﬂight data of the ”own” aircraft. But if
a conﬂict is detected, it determines the resolution maneuver, and then sends
out the new ﬂight data to both the next mode automaton and the neighbor-
ing aircraft automata. We developed the automata corresponding to each
resolution maneuver and proved that if this system starts in a safe state, it
will remain in a safe state.
For the second system, a novel spatially decentralized, cooperative policy
for conﬂict resolution was developed. This decentralized conﬂict avoidance
algorithm is used for higher dimensional problems. In this method, each
aircraft is surrounded by a virtual cylinder called conservative buﬀer. A
suﬃcient condition to ensure safety is that the interiors of conservative buﬀers
are disjoint at all times; if such a condition is met, conﬂicts can be avoided
if agents hold their conservative buﬀers ﬁxed, and move within them. As
a consequence, each point of contact between conservative buﬀers deﬁnes
a constraint on further motion for both agents involved. The amount of
information needed to compute the bound is uniformly bounded, independent
from the total number of agents in the system: in fact, the maximum number
of agents whose conservative buﬀer is in contact with the conservative buﬀer
of the computing agent is twenty. The resolution maneuvers for this model
are straight, turn, climb/descend, and hold. The details of the HIOA for this
extended algorithm are presented. This policy is safe if the initial conditions
satisfy a rather non-restrictive condition
97
References
[1] C. D. Wickens, A. S. Mavor, and J. P. McGee, Eds., Flight to the Fu-
ture: Human Factors in Air Traﬃc Control. Washington, DC: Na-
tional Academy Press, 1997.
[2] M. S. Nolan, Ed., Fundamentals of air traﬃc control. Brooks Cole,
1999.
[3] E. M. Rantanen, A. Naseri, and N. A. Neogi, “Evaluation of airspace
complexity and dynamic density metrics derived from operational
data,” Air Traﬃc Control Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 65–88, 2007.
[4] L. C. Thomas and E. M. Rantanen, “Human factors issues in imple-
mentation of advanced aviation technologies: A case of false alerts
and cockpit displays of traﬃc information,” Theoretical Issues of Er-
gonomics Science, vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 501–523, 2006.
[5] L. C. Thomas, C. D. Wickens, and E. M. Rantanen, “Imperfect au-
tomation in aviation traﬃc alerts: a review of conﬂict detection al-
gorithms and their implications for human factors research,” in Proc.
47th Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society,
Santa Monica, CA, 2003.
[6] H. Erzberger, T. J. Davis, and S. Green, “Design of center-tracon
automation system,” in AGARD Guidance and Control Symposium
Machin Intelligence in Air Traﬃc Management, Berlin, Germany,
1993, pp. 11.1–11.12.
[7] D. J. Brudnicki and A. L. Mcfarland, “User request evaluation tool
(uret) conﬂict probe performance and beneﬁts assessment,” in US-
A/Europe ATM Seminar, Paris, 1997.
[8] H. Blom and J. Lygeros, Eds., Stochastic Hybrid Systems: Theory and
Safety Critical Applications. New York: Springer, 2006.
[9] L. R. Rabiner and B. H. Juang, “An introduction to hidden Markov
models,” IEEE ASSP Magazine, vol. 3, pp. 4–16, Jan. 1986.
[10] N. Lynch, R. Segala, and F. Vaandraager, “Hybrid I/O automata,”
Information and Computation, vol. 185, pp. 105–157, Aug 2003.
98
[11] S. Mitra, “A veriﬁcation framework for hybrid systems,” Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Massachusetts, sep
2007.
[12] J. K. Kuchar and L. C. Yang, “A review of conﬂict detection and reso-
lution modeling methods,” IEEE Trans. on Intelligent Transportation
Systems, vol. 1, pp. 179–189, Dec. 2000.
[13] B. D. Carpenter and J. K. Kuchar, “Probability-based collision alert-
ing logic for closely-spaced parallel approach,” in AIAA Meeting Pa-
pers on Disc, Reston, VA, 1997.
[14] R. A. Paielli and H. Erzberger, “Conﬂict probability estimation for
free ﬂight,” J. of AIAA Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, vol. 20, pp.
588–596, Jun. 1997.
[15] H. Erzberger, R. A. Paielli, D. R. Isaacson, and M. M. Eshowl, “Con-
ﬂict detection and resolution in the presence of prediction error,”
in 1st USA/Eur. Air Traﬃc Management R & D Seminar, Saclay,
France, 1997.
[16] R. A. Paielli, “Empirical test of conﬂict probability estimation,” in
2nd USA/Eur. Air Traﬃc Management R & D Seminar, Florida,
1998.
[17] K. Blin et al., “A stochastic conﬂict detection model revisited,” in
Proc. AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference, Reston,
VA, 2000.
[18] T. Loureiro, K. Blin, E. Hoﬀman, and K. Zeghal, “Development of
a tool comparing conﬂict detection algorithms for air traﬃc man-
agement,” in Proc. Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference,
Canada, 2001.
[19] M. Prandini, J. Hu, J. Lygeros, and S. Sastry, “A probabilistic ap-
proach to aircraft conﬂict detection,” IEEE Transactions on Intelli-
gent Transportation Systems, vol. 1, pp. 199–220, Dec. 2000.
[20] I. Hwang, J. Hwang, and C. Tomlin, “Flight-mode-based aircraft con-
ﬂict detection using a residual-mean interacting multiple model algo-
rithm,” in Proc. AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference,
Austin, TX, 2003.
[21] X. R. Li and Y. Bar-Shalom, “Design of an interacting multiple model
algorithm for air traﬃc control tracking,” IEEE Trans. on Control,
Systems Yechnology, vol. 1, pp. 186–194, Sep. 1993.
[22] E. Mazor et al., “Interacting multiple model methods in target track-
ing: a survey,” IEEE Trans. on Aerospace and Electronics Systems,
vol. 34, pp. 103–123, Jan. 1998.
99
[23] C. G. Cassandras and J. Lygeros, Eds., Stochastic Hybrid Systems.
Boca Raton: CRC, Taylor and Francis, 2006.
[24] M. L. Bujorianu, W. Glover, J. Lygeros, and G. Pola, “A stochastic
hybrid process modeling framework,” HYBRIDGE, Tech. Rep. IST-
2001-32460, 2003.
[25] M. L. Bujorianu and J. Lygeros, “General stochastic hybrid systems:
Modeling and optimal control,” in Proc. IEEE Conference on Decision
and Control, vol. 2, New York, NY, 2004, pp. 1872–1877.
[26] G. Pola, M. L. Bujorianu, J. Lygeros, and M. D. DiBenedetto,
“Stochastic hybrid models: An overview,” in Proc. of IFAC Confer-
ence on Analysis and Design of Hybrid Systems ADHS, France, 2003,
pp. 45–50.
[27] J. Hu, J. Lygeros, and S. Sastry, Towards a Theory of Stochastic Hy-
brid Systems, ser. Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control, 2000,
pp. 160–173.
[28] M. K. Ghosh, A. Arapostathis, and S. I. Marcus, “Ergodic control of
switching diﬀusions,” SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization,
vol. 35, pp. 1952–1988, Nov. 1997.
[29] M. K. Ghosh and A. Baghchi, “Modeling stochastic hybrid systems,”
in 21st IFIP TC7 Conference on System Modeling and Optimization,
France, 2003.
[30] M. H. A. Davis, Markov Processes and Optimization. London: Chap-
man and Hall, 1993.
[31] E. C. Hahn and C. R. Wanke, “Preliminary requirements for avionics
intent information for free ﬂight,” in 14th Digital Avionics Systems
Conference, Cambridge, MA, 1995, pp. 462–467.
[32] J. K. Kuchar and L. C. Yang, “Incorporation of uncertain intent infor-
mation in conﬂict detection and resolution,” in Proc. IEEE Conference
on Decision and Control, California, 1997, pp. 1810–1815.
[33] L. C. Yang and J. K. Kuchar, “Using intent information in probabilis-
tic conﬂict analysis,” in Proc. AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Con-
trol Conference, Boston, MA, 1998, pp. 797–806.
[34] V. A. Carreno and C. Munoz, “Implicit intent information for conﬂict
detection and alerting,” in Proc. 23rd Digital Avionics Systems Con-
ference, Salt Lake City, Utah, 2004.
[35] Y. Zhao, C. Haissig, and M. J. Hoﬀmann, “Analysis of pilot intent in
air traﬃc management,” in Proc. IEEE American Control Conference,
New York, 1998, pp. 1789–1792.
100
[36] T. G. Reynolds and R. J. Hansman, “Investigating conformance mon-
itoring issues in air traﬃc control using fault detection techniques,”
AIAA Journal of Aircraft, vol. 42, pp. 1307–1317, Oct. 2005.
[37] J. Krozel and D. Andrisani, “Intent inference with path prediction,”
AIAA Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, vol. 29, pp. 225–
236, Apr. 2006.
[38] L. E. Baum and T. Petrie, “Statistical inference for probabilistic func-
tions of ﬁnite state Markov chains,” The Annals of Mathematical
Statistics, vol. 37, pp. 1554–1563, 1966.
[39] L. E. Baum and J. A. Egon, “An inequality with applications to sta-
tistical estimation for probabilistic functions of a Markov process and
to a model for ecology,” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Soci-
ety, vol. 73, pp. 360–363, 1967.
[40] L. E. Baum and G. R. Sell, “Growth functions for transformations on
manifolds,” Paciﬁc Journal of Mathematics, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 211–
227, 1968.
[41] L. E. Baum, T. Petrie, G. Soules, and N. Weiss, “A maximization
technique occuring in the statistical analysis of probabilistic functions
of Markov chains,” The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, vol. 41,
no. 1, pp. 164–171, 1970.
[42] L. R. Rabiner and B. H. Juang, Eds., Fundamentals of Speech Recogni-
tion. Englewood Cliﬀs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993.
[43] J. K. Baker, “Stochastic modeling as a means of automatic speech
recognition,” Ph.D. dissertation, Carnegie-Mellon University, 1975.
[44] A. B. Pritz and A. G. Richter, “On hidden Markov models in isolated
word recogition,” in International Conference on Acoustics, Speech,
and Signal Processing (ICASSP), Tokyo, 1986, pp. 705–708.
[45] R. L. Cave and L. P. Neuwirth, “Hidden Markov models for English,”
in Symposium on the Applications of Hidden Markov Models to Text
and Speech, Princeton, NJ, 1980, pp. 16–56.
[46] F. Jelinek, “Self-organized language modeling for speech recognition,”
T.J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY, Tech. Rep.,
1985.
[47] E. Birney, “Hidden Markov models in biological sequence analysis,”
IBM Journal of Research and Development, vol. 45, no. 3/4, pp. 449–
454, 2001.
101
[48] D. Ourston, S. Matzner, W. Stump, and B. Hopkins, “Applications
of hidden Markov models to detecting multi-stage network attacks,”
in 36th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Hawaii,
2003.
[49] R. Khanna and H. Liu, “System approach to intrusion detection us-
ing hidden Markov model,” in International Conference on Wireless
Communications and Mobile Computing, Vancouver, Canada, 2006.
[50] A. B. Poritz, “Hidden Markov models: a guided tour,” in Proc. IEEE
International Conference of Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing,
New York, 1988, pp. 7–13.
[51] Z. Ghahramani, “An introduction to hidden Markov models and
bayesian networks,” Int. J. of Pattern Recognition and Artiﬁcial In-
telligence, vol. 15, pp. 9–42, Feb. 2001.
[52] J. Bilmes, “What HMMs can do,” University of Washington, Dep. Of
EE, Seattle, WA, Tech. Rep. UWEETR-2002-2003, 2002.
[53] L. R. Rabiner, “A tutorial on hidden Markov models and selected ap-
plications in speech recognition,” Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 2, pp. 257–
286, Feb. 1989.
[54] S. Adlakha, S. Lall, and A. Goldsmith, “Information state for Markov
decision processes with network delays,” in IEEE Conference on Deci-
sion and Control, Cancun, dec 2008, pp. 3840–3847.
[55] J. D. Williams, P. Poupart, and S. Young, “Factored partially ob-
servable Markov decision processes for dialogue management,” in 4th
Workshop on Knowledge and Reasoning in Practical Dialog Systems,
2005.
[56] L. F. Winder, “Hazard avoidance alerting with Markov decision pro-
cesses,” Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Massachusetts, Aug 2004.
[57] L. P. Kaelbling, M. L. Littman, and A. R. Cassandra, “Planning and
acting in partially observable stochastic domains,” Artiﬁcial Intelli-
gence, vol. 101, pp. 99–134, 1998.
[58] S. H. Mills, E. M. Pﬂeiderer, and C. A. Manning, “POWER: Objec-
tive activity and taskload assessment in en route air traﬃc control,”
FAA, Tech. Rep. DOT/FAA/AM-02/2, 2002.
[59] C. Gong and D. McNally, “A methodology for automated trajectory
prediction analysis,” in Proc. AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Con-
trol, Providence, Rhode Island, 2004.
102
[60] R. J. Hansman and H. J. Davison, “The eﬀect of shared information
on pilot/controller and controller/controller interactions,” in 3rd US-
A/Eur. Air Traﬃc Management R & D Seminar, Napoli, Italy, 2000.
[61] N. A. Neogi and A. Naseri, “Using hidden Markov models to detect
mode changes in aircraft ﬂight data for conﬂict resolution,” in Proc.
IEEE Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Taiwan, 2006, pp. 3732–3737.
[62] A. Naseri, N. A. Neogi, and E. M. Rantanen, “Stochastic hybrid mod-
els with applications to air traﬃc management,” in Proc. AIAA Guid-
ance, Navigation, and Control, no. AIAA-2007-6696, Hilton Head, SC,
2007.
[63] C. E. Seah and I. Hwang, “A hybrid estimation algorithm for
terminal-area aircraft tracking,” in Proc. AIAA Guidance, Navigation,
and Control, Hilton Head, SC, 2007.
[64] N. Lynch, S. Mitra, and T. Nolte, “Motion coordination using virtual
nodes,” in 44th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and Euro-
pean Control Conference, Seville, Spain, 2005, pp. 2823 – 2828.
[65] M. M. Zavlanos and G. J. Pappas, “Dynamic assignment in dis-
tributed motion planning with local coordination,” IEEE Transactions
on Robotics, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 232–242, 2008.
[66] C. Tomlin, G. J. Pappas, and S. Sastry, “Conﬂict resolution for air
traﬃc management: A study in multiagent hybrid systems,” IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 509–521, 1998.
[67] V. J. Lumelski and K. R. Harinarayan, “Decentralized motion plan-
ning for multiple mobile robots: the cocktail party model,” Au-
tonomous Robots, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 121–135, 1997.
[68] E. Klavins, “Communication complexity of multi-robot systems,”
in Fifth International Workshop on the Algorithmic Foundations of
Robotics, Nice, France, 2002.
[69] C. Tomlin and M. R. Greenstreet, Eds., Hybrid Systems: Communica-
tion and control, 5th international workshop, HSCC 2002, ser. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. Stanford, CA: Springer, 2002, vol. 2289.
[70] L. Pallottino, V. Scordio, and A. Bicchi, “Decentralized cooperative
conﬂict resolution among multiple autonomous mobile agents,” in
IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Paradise Island, Bahamas,
2004.
[71] T. A. Henzinger, P. W. Kopke, A. Puri, and P. Varaiya, “What’s de-
cidable about hybrid automata?” Journal of Computer and System
Sciences, vol. 57, pp. 94–124, 1998.
103
[72] G. Laﬀerriere, G. J. Pappas, and S. Yovine, “A new class of decidable
hybrid systems,” in Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control, 1st ed.
Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 1999, pp. 137–151.
[73] O. Maler and A. Pnueli, Eds., Hybrid Systems: Communication and
control, 6th international workshop, HSCC 2003, ser. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science. Prague, Czech Republic: Springer, 2003, vol. 2623.
[74] R. Alur and G. J. Pappas, Eds., Hybrid Systems: Communication and
control, 7th international workshop, HSCC 2004, ser. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science. Philadelphia, PA: Springer, 2004, vol. 2993.
[75] M. Morari and L. Thiele, Eds., Hybrid Systems: Communication and
control, 8th international workshop, HSCC 2005, ser. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science.
[76] J. P. Hespanha and A. Tiwari, Eds., Hybrid Systems: Communica-
tion and control, 9th international workshop, HSCC 2006, ser. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. Santa Barbara, CA: Springer, 2006, vol.
3927.
[77] A. Bemporad, A. Bicchi, and G. C. Buttazzo, Eds., Hybrid Systems:
COmmunication and control, 10th international workshop, HSCC
2007, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Pisa, Italy: Springer,
2007, vol. 4416.
[78] M. Egerstedt and B. Mishra, Eds., Hybrid Systems: Communication
and control, 11th international workshop, HSCC 2008, ser. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. St. Louis, MO: Springer, 2008, vol. 4981.
[79] D. M. Stipanovic´, I. Hwang, and C. J. Tomlin, “Computation of an
over-approximation of the backward reachable set using subsystem
level set functions,” Dynamics of Cont., Discrete and Impulsive Sys-
tems Series A: Mathematical Analysis, vol. 11, pp. 399–411, 2004.
[80] I. Hwang, D. M. Stipanovic´, and C. J. Tomlin, “Polytopic approxi-
mation of reachable sets applied to linear dynamic games and to a
class of nonlinear systems,” in Advances in Control, Communication
Networks, and Transportation Systems: In Honor of Pravin Varaiya,
E. H. Abed, Ed. Boston, MA: Birkhau¨ser, 2005, pp. 3–19.
[81] E. Asarin, O. Bournez, T. Dang, and O. Maler, “Approximate reach-
ability analysis of piecewise-linear dynamical systems,” in Hybrid Sys-
tems: Computation and Control, LNCS, B. Krogh and N. Lynch, Eds.
Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2000, pp. 20–31.
[82] I. Mitchell and C. J. Tomlin, “Level set methods for computation in
hybrid systems,” in Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control, LNCS,
104
B. Krogh and N. Lynch, Eds. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2000, pp. 310–
323.
[83] A. Girard, C. L. Guernic, and O. Maler, “Eﬃcient computation of
reachable sets of linear time-invariant systems with inputs,” in Hybrid
Systems: Computation and Control, 2006, pp. 257–271.
[84] I. Mitchell, A. M. Bayen, and C. J. Tomlin, “Computing reachable
sets for continuous dynamic games using level set methods,” vol. 50,
pp. 947–957, 2005.
[85] A. M. Bayen, E. Cruck, and C. Tomlin, “uaranteed overapproxima-
tions of unsafe sets for continuous and hybrid systems : Solving the
hamilton-jacobi equation using viability techniques,” in 5th Inter-
national Workshop on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control,
LNCS, Stanford, CA, 2002, pp. 90–104.
[86] N. A. Lynch, “A three-level analysis of a simple acceleration maneu-
ver, with uncertainties,” in Third AMAST Workshop on Real-Time
Systems, Salt Lake City, UT, 1996, pp. 1–22.
[87] C. Livadas, J. Lygeros, and N. A. Lynch, “High-level modeling and
analysis of TCAS,” in 20th IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium
(RTSS 99), Phoenix, AZ, 1999, pp. 115–125.
[88] H. B. Weinberg, N. A. Lynch, and N. Delisle, “Veriﬁcation of auto-
mated vehicle protection systems,” in Hybrid Systems III: Veriﬁcation
and Control Workshop on Veriﬁcation and Control of Hybrid Systems,
LNCS, 1995, pp. 101–113.
[89] H. B. Weinberg and N. A. Lynch, “Correctness of vehicle control sys-
tems - a case study,” in 17th IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium
(RTSS 96), Washington, DC, 1996, pp. 62–72.
[90] E. Frazzoli, L. Pallottino, and A. Bicchi, “Decentralized cooperative
conﬂict resolution for multiple nonholonomic vehicles,” in Proc. AIAA
Guidance, Navigation, and Control, San Fransisco, CA, 2005.
105
